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Artificial space debris is a new and threatening reality. This thesis examines the 
requirement of acknowledging this threat as one of the major considerations in the design 
of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites. The paper commences with a comprehensive view of 
the issue; the facts of the case are presented. It is necessary to understand the physical 
fundamentals of this multi-faceted problem in order to view it as a genuine threat to 
satellites. Following this introduction, an overview of how the problem is currently 
approached, from a political and technical standpoint, is discussed. Strategies for coping 
with the space debris issue are then presented. From these, the paper focuses on the most 
promising prospect for the future. It highlights the need for new and responsible satellite 
design philosophies in order to deal with the uncertainties of the LEO environment. The 
research effort concludes that space debris considerations must be incorporated at the 
earliest phases of a satellite's design efforts, and must be a continuing commitment 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When speaking of space, one tends to associate it with terms such as "infinite" and 
"empty". For the most part valid, this description could not be farther from the truth in 
the context of near Earth space. Figure 1 is a graphical depiction of all catalogued items 
currently occupying near Earth space. 
·. 
·. 
·. . .. 
Figure 1. Graphical Depiction of Current Cataloged Space Objects. [Ref.1, p. 7] 
In 1957, the first artificial satellite was launched by the Soviet Union. Since then, 
space activities have continued, with the result that a large number of man-made objects 
remain in orbit about the Earth. Unfortunately, most of these objects no longer serve any 
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useful purpose. In fact, most of the objects are not spacecraft as such, but pieces resulting 
from breakups or otherwise associated with past launch operations. Collectively, these 
objects have been labeled "space debris." 
There is a growing sense of awareness about the dangers these objects pose to both 
the present and future operations in space, spurred on by increased international 
participation. Technical research and open exchange of available information has 
allowed scientists new insight into the subject. Through these efforts, an inescapable fact 
has emerged: if appropriate measures are not applied, space debris will jeopardize nearly 
all future space activities. 
A first step toward dealing with this problem is to learn to treat it as a genuine 
threat. The issue of space debris must be viewed as a serious space environmental 
problem. Unfortunately, the seriousness of the problem is often downplayed because of 
the previously mentioned misconceptions about space. As ESA stated in the preface to 
its report on space debris: "The sheer immensity of space is the main obstacle to the 
recognition of the issue of space debris." [Ref. 2, p. 3] The old adage "big sky, small 
plane" prevails, blinding the vast majority to the truth. 
The eventual solution to the problem lies in changing these false perceptions and 
convincing decision makers that some manner of debris mitigation must be applied. This 
in itself will be a challenge, given that most mitigation measures are more expensive than 
present practices/applications and promise only a small, short term gain. 
Part of the intent of this research effort is to help foster an increased sense of 
urgency in dealing with the space debris issue. Under current practices, the problem only 
worsens with time; it must be dealt with as a legitimate threat and with realistic solutions. 
The primary focus ofthis paper, however, is to examine the debris issue by coming to an 
understanding of the physical characteristics of debris, studying current related policies 
and practices, and evaluating conventional strategies for addressing the debris 
predicament. One possible venue for addressing the problem is also discussed. In 
general, it proposes that the incorporation of debris mitigation measures are vital to 
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addressing the space debris problem. Specifically, it notes that failure to implement these 
measures at the conceptual phase of spacecraft mission and operations design will result 
in both the potential loss of said spacecraft and the continued exacerbation of the 
problem. In order to support this endeavor, chapters within this paper have been designed 
to lead a reader to this established goal. Chapter II provides a comprehensive view into 
the basic fundamentals of the issue and gives a quantitative look at the space debris 
situation; it is intended to present objective, numerical data surrounding the issue. More 
importantly, however, it serves to educate the reader as to the true extent of the matter 
without having to revert to unsubstantiated cries of rhetoric. In this manner, inexpert 
readers can understand the limits of the problem; an informed reader can then make an 
informed decision concerning the predicament. The purpose of Chapter III is to illustrate 
the seriousness of the issue by demonstrating the degree of ongoing political and 
scientific efforts. It also serves to give the reader a feeling as to where the international 
space community currently stands on the subject of space debris. Chapter IV discusses 
conventional strategies and methods for coping with the current and projected debris 
environment. The core of the thesis, Chapter V, focuses on how to assure survivability in 
the space debris environment. The goal of this section is to show the reader that well 
thought-out actions are necessary in order to survive in LEO. Among other things, this 
proposal includes changing one's perspective as to how to approach the problem, coupled 
with new, trend-setting methodologies for spacecraft design and operational procedures. 
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II. ORBITAL DEBRIS: A NEW REALITY 
The intent of this chapter is to provide a broad oversight into the fundamental 
properties and issues governing the space debris problem. It's purpose is to educate the 
reader on the major concerns in a cursory manner. This chapter has been intentionally 
written to present individual debris characteristics one at a time, without referring to or 
describing other closely related debris properties. As the reader will soon discover, this is 
difficult given the fact that so much concerning space debris is dynamic in nature and 
fundamentally a cause and effect relationship; that is, it's hard to talk about one thing 
without talking about another. 
A. ORBITAL DEBRIS 
Throughout this research, two distinct groups, at opposite ends of the debate, have 
come to light. The conservative group, for the most part, maintains that the problem is 
not that threatening and is far removed from our daily concerns. On the other hand, 
alarmists overstate the problem, and attribute inconsistencies in data to an automatic, 
worst case scenario. They tend to lose credibility in this manner. It is the intent of this 
chapter to provide factual information regarding the space debris issue. 
People base their opinions on available information. There are many unknowns 
regarding the specific orbital debris population, distribution, and composition. We tend 
to speak of space debris in general terms. Causes for this degree of uncertainty are 
addressed later in this paper. For now, it is sufficient to note this lack of specificity, and 
keep in mind that it is an incomplete picture of the true orbital debris situation. Hence, 
whatever is known about the orbital debris environment paints either an accurate, best, or 
worst case scenario. 
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1. Definition 
Up to now, this paper has made inappropriate use of the term 'space debris'. One 
could likely think that the term refers to any object orbiting the Earth. Actually, the term 
is quite specific. Space debris, also known as orbital or artificial debris, can be defined as 
those man-made objects in orbit about the Earth which are not considered to be active, 
useful satellite payloads. Incidently, these three terms will be used interchangeably 
throughout the remainder of this paper. Man-made orbital debris differs from natural 
meteoroids in two major respects: first, it remains captured in Earth orbit for the duration 
of its lifetime, and; second, unlike meteoroids, it is not transient through the space around 
the Earth. [Ref. 3, p. 1] Moreover, the meteoroid environment encompasses only 
particles of natural ongm. This study considers only the artificial orbital debris 
environment. 
a. Background 
In general, the motion of an object in orbit is in the shape of an ellipse. For 
that matter, the orbits of all the planets in the solar system, as well as the orbits of all 
Earth satellites, are ellipses. In this context, orbital debris can be regarded as an Earth 
bound satellite. Since an ellipse is a closed curve, an object in an elliptical orbit travels 
the same path over and over. The time for the satellite to go once around its orbit is 
called the period. The degree of eccentricity of an orbit helps define the relative shape of 
the ellipse. Eccentricity values range from zero to one: a circle has an eccentricity of 
zero; as it approaches the value of one, the shape becomes more elliptical. With space 
debris, we concern ourselves with one of two types of orbits: low eccentric or 
pseudo-circular orbits, and eccentric or elliptical orbits. Circular orbits are special cases 
of elliptical orbits; they maintain a low eccentricity value and only approximate true 
circles. Objects in this type of orbit remain at a near constant altitude from the center of 
the Earth. Additionally, an object in this orbit maintains a nearly constant velocity value 
throughout its entire revolution. On the other hand, an object in an elliptical orbit varies 
in distance from the center of the Earth as it orbits. The closest point of approach to the 
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Earth is called the object's perigee; the object's maximum velocity occurs at perigee. The 
object's farthest point from the Earth is called the apogee; minimum velocity occurs at 
apogee. 
The space around Earth is generally divided into three orbital regimes. The 
first is known as Low Earth Orbit (LEO). It is defined as an orbit with an altitude ranging 
anywhere between 150 to 5500 kilometers (km). The period of these orbits are on the 
order of 90 to 225 minutes; anywhere from 6 to 16 revolutions per day. Next, there is 
Medium Earth Orbit (MEO). It is defined by objects orbiting the Earth between LEO and 
Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO). Lastly, as one might have guessed, there is GEO. 
The GEO orbit contains objects orbiting the Earth at an altitude of approximately 36,000 
km. At this altitude, periodicity equates to approximately 24 hours. Active satellites 
normally occupy LEO and GEO. [Ref. 3, p. 2] 
b. Types 
For the purposes of this study, space debris is categorized into three general 
groups: sizes 0.01 centimeter (em) and below, which can cause surface erosion on a 
spacecraft; sizes ranging between 0.01 em to 1 em, that can produce significant damage 




Space debris composition is varied and includes dissimilar materials. This is 
because composition is directly related to the originating source of the debris. In tum, 
this peculiarity is due to the many different available sources of space debris. It is, 
therefore, difficult to categorize large space debris objects by composition. Sources of 
orbital debris will be discussed in more detail later 
There is more certainty, however, when describing the composition of very 
small debris particles. Very small orbital debris particles are created by the disintegration 
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of spacecraft surfaces, such as paint flaking, plastic and metal erosion, and by firing of 
solid propellant motors, which produce aluminum oxide particles. New studies of 
impacts on returned spacecraft indicate that at sizes below 0.05 em, space debris such as 
paint flakes or aluminum oxide pieces from rocket fuel comprise more than half the 
impacts. [Ref. 2, p. 190] Information gathered from the Long Duration Exposure 
Facility (LDEF) provides a more precise evaluation. A total of 1225 craters were 
detected on the gold and aluminum surfaces of LDEF; they were examined in order to 
determine the make-up of the projectile residues. From their findings, four subclasses of 
orbital debris were established: Fe-Ni-Cr rich particles representing stainless steel; 
Zn-Ti-Cl rich residues representing thermal protective spacecraft paints; Ag, Cu or Pb-Sn 
rich residues originating from solar cell or other electrical and electronic components of 
spacecraft; and pure aluminum. [Ref. 2, p. 190]. 
b. Velocities 
Ideally, orbital debris will remain m its orbit as long as its velocity is 
sufficient to produce the required centrifugal force to counteract the pull of Earth's 
gravity. An object will remain in its orbit, traveling with the same overall velocity (for 
highly elliptical orbits, the velocity vector quantity remains constant; its component unit 
vectors vary in value), as long as these forces are balanced. In general, space debris 
objects pass one another at an average relative velocity of 10 km/sec. Relative velocity 
depends on the reference frame from which a velocity is measured. In the context of this 
paper, only velocities relative to a spacecraft should be considered. Tremendous relative 
velocities are generated whenever two orbiting objects approach and pass one another. 
Figure 2 shows the range of relative velocities for various altitudes and orbital 
inclinations. For instance, objects in LEO travel at an average velocity of 7 Km/sec; 
velocities in GEO are lower. A maximum relative velocity occurs when an object is at 
perigee in an elliptical retrograde orbit; minimum velocity will occur at apogee. Velocity 
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Figure 2. Average Relative Velocities for Different Inclination Settings. [Ref. 1, p. 72] 
c. Mass 
The greatest number of tracked objects are in LEO, the second largest number 
are in GEO, and the remaining objects are in MEO. The estimated mass of man-made 
orbiting objects within 2,000 km of the Earth's surface is about 3,000,000 kilograms (kg). 
This is 15,000 times more than the natural meteoroid mass. Most of this mass is 
contained in about 3,000 spent rocket stages, inactive satellites, and a few active 
satellites. A smaller amount of mass, about 40,000 kg, is in the remaining 4,000 objects 
currently being tracked by the US Space Command (USSPACECOM) radar [Ref. 3, p. 4]. 
Figure 3 depicts a pie chart diagram of the breakdown of cataloged object mass. 
Interestingly, LEO objects must be larger than about 10 em in order to be maintained in 
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this catalog [Ref. 2,p. 252]. USSPACECOM and the catalog will be discussed at length 





Figure 3. Mass Breakdown of Catalogued Objects. [Ref. 4, p. 478] 
Given the variation m mass and velocities, space debris can create 
tremendous amounts of energy upon impacting with one another. In classical mechanics, 
the momentum of a particle is equal to its mass (m) times its velocity (v); its kinetic 
energy is equal to YzmY. The effects of representative sizes of debris are shown in Figure 
4. 
d. Orbit 
Most space debris objects are in a high inclination orbit. The inclination is 
the angle between the plane of the orbit (the elliptical plane) and the equatorial plane of 
the Earth. For operational, spent or intact rocket bodies, and inactive payloads, the 
originating launch site latitude and launch azimuth affect the orbit inclination. 
Nonetheless, space debris can occupy a large range of inclination planes. The range of 
objects in orbit by inclination is shown in Figure 5. Higher inclination objects will 
9 
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produce larger relative velocities for low inclination satellites; most US space assets are 
in low inclination orbits. [Ref. 6, p. 85] The USSP ACECOM data base has measured 
trackable objects with inclinations ranging from 0 through 145 degrees. Refer to Table 1 
for a complete breakdown [Ref. 7, p. 19]. Additional information concerning the 
inclination aspects of orbital debris can be garnered from Figure 6. It depicts orbital 
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Figure 5. Inclination Distribution of Catalogued Objects. [Ref. 6, p. 85] 
TABLE 1. USSPACECOM POPULATION DISTRIBUTION. [REF. 7, P. 19] 
Period 
Inclination 87 95 100 105 110 115 120 TOTAL 
10.0-20.0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 3 
20.0-40.0 22 78 48 65 19 18 40 290 
40.0-60.0 32 23 18 17 9 30 29 158 
60.0-70.0 44 68 367 230 129 83 40 961 
70.0-80.0 18 75 279 34 191 334 11 942 
80.0-90.0 29 180 523 219 99 43 127 1,220 
90.0-100.0 57 201 461 183 76 4 19 1,001 
1 00.0 - 11 0.0 1 6 39 69 152 287 72 626 
110.0-145.0 0 0 11 4 0 2 4 21 
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Figure 6. Diagram of Orbital Period vs. Inclination of Catalogued Objects. [Ref 1, p. 3] 
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Of interest when discussing inclination aspects of space debris is the ability 
of space debris to produce debris clouds. These occur either upon impact or as a result of 
satellite break-up or fragmentation. Debris resulting after an explosion initially forms an 
ellipsoid; it quickly evolves into an irregular, narrow torus about the Earth due to 
differential velocity in orbital debris. After fragmentation, the debris quickly forms a ring 
within a narrow band of orbital planes constrained by the changes in inclination. The 
orbits are also constrained in altitude by changes in the perigee and apogee, normally 
several hundred kilometers. However, the orbital planes begin to spread apart. 
Eventually, debris cloud dispersion advances to such an extent that the tracks of the 
orbiting debris trace a thin shell about the Earth with a hole centered at each pole. [Ref. 6, 
12 
p. 9] Additional information on satellite break-up phenomena is presented later in this 
paper. 
Another important parameter used in describing debris is altitude. In the 
context of this paper, altitude is normally measured in either kilometers (km) or nautical 
miles (run), and is defined as the straight line distance between the center of mass of an 
orbiting object and the surface of the Earth. Similarly, debris also occupies the whole 
spectrum of LEO altitude ranges. Two illustrations highlight this condition. Figure 7 
provides a distribution of objects as a function of altitude. Figure 8 depicts the number of 
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Figure 8. Altitude Regime of Catalogued Objects. [Ref. 1, p. 19] 
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Depending on several factors, orbital debris lifetimes range anywhere from 
several hours to several million years. Debris altitude and area-to-mass ratios make 
significant contributions to the determination of an object's orbital lifetime, as do 
environmental forces. 
In general, an orbiting object falls into progressively lower orbits if the 
balance between centripetal and centrifugal forces is not maintained. An object losses 
energy through friction with the upper reaches of the atmosphere and other orbit 
perturbing forces. Through the conservation of energy, orbital velocity increases as its 
altitude decreases. Once inside the atmospheric envelope, drag will slow down an object 
rapidly and cause it to either bum up or de-orbit and fall to Earth. 
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Orbital lifetimes for objects in elliptical orbits differ significantly from those 
in circular orbit. For elliptical orbits, the lower the perigee altitude, the greater the 
atmospheric drag effects. Thus, an object in an elliptical orbit will have a higher apogee 
decay rate and a shorter on-orbit lifetime than an object in a circular orbit of equal energy. 
The natural decay of orbiting debris is also affected by the eleven year solar 
cycle. High solar activity heats up the atmosphere and causes it to expand and move to 
higher altitudes. Density at higher altitudes increases and causes objects to decay more 
rapidly. Additional information on this topic is discussed later in the chapter. 
Given these considerations, objects in circular orbits at altitudes between 200 
and 400 km typically re-enter the atmosphere within a few months. At higher altitudes, 
400 to 900 km, orbital lifetimes can exceed a year or more; at 900 km, lifetimes can be 
500 years or more! As altitude increases, the importance of atmospheric drag diminishes. 
Thus, at GEO, orbital lifetimes are on the order of millions ofyears. [Ref. 2] 
3. Population 
The precise number of man-made objects in space is not known. This 
uncertainty is due to several factors that are discussed later in this paper. Within the past 
three decades, approximately 23,000 artificial objects have been cataloged. Of these, 
approximately 7,200 currently remain aloft. Figure 9 presents a breakdown of cataloged 
debris population; Figure 10 provides a breakdown in terms of numbers of cataloged 
objects. It would seem that, given the orbits most frequently used, 7,200 objects would 
not constitute a large crowding problem. In fact, there is an average of7.51x10-9 objects 
per km3 in the 300 to 1,500 km altitude regime. However, the numbers do not stop there. 
Figure 11 illustrates the growth of catalogued objects in space since 1957. Objects put 
into orbit seldom remain as they were on the ground. Objects shed several items, such as 
shrouds, lens caps, and nuts. Moreover, most artificial space objects are too small to be 
detected from the ground using conventional tracking techniques. As previously 
mentioned, the smallest of the more than 7,200 objects catalogued by USSPACECOM are 
about 10 em across. Use of detection methods more sensitive than those employed to 
15 
create this catalog has produced dramatically higher estimates of the number of space 
debris objects. There are now estimated to be about 20 untrackable 1 em objects and 
nearly 10,000 untrackable 1 millimeter (mm) objects for every trackable object. Artificial 
objects as small as 1 micron (1 o-6) meters, could number 100 trillion; refer to Figures 11 
and 12. 
a. Current and Projected 
The distribution and flux, that is, either the amount of debris passing through 
a given area of space over time or a given amount of debris passing through an area over 
a period of time, are dependent on many variables. These variables, discussed below, 
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Figure 11. Historical Growth of Catalogued Objects. [Ref. 8, p. 470] 
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Figure 12. Number of Objects in LEO Measured by Various Methods. [Ref. 9, p. 3] 
Figure 13 illustrates the average flux resulting from USSP ACECOM's 
catalogued population. It compares the flux of catalogued objects in LEO, 0-10,000 km 
regime, with that in GEO, approximately 23,000 km altitude. The average flux in GEO 
is considerably lower than that in LEO. However, it is important to note that in GEO 
there is only one natural process, solar wind, which will eventually eliminate an object 
from this altitude. Although there are fewer, they are there for a longer amount of time. 
However, by combining the results of other measurement efforts, such as the LDEF and 
Solar Max, a clearer picture has emerged. Figure 14 provides a summary of the best 
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Figure 13. Average Flux of Cataloged Population. [Ref. 10] 
The size distribution measured by Haystack, a very sensitive radar, clearly 
demonstrates that flux significantly increases with decreasing orbital debris size for sizes 
smaller than 1 0 em. Other experiments illustrate that this trend continues to sizes as 
small as 1 micron; however, because sizes smaller than 1 mm have only been measured at 
lower altitudes, there is some uncertainty as to how these measurements should be 
combined with the optical and Haystack measurements, where a larger range of altitudes 
have been measured. Models predict that the flux of debris smaller than 1 mm should 
increase with altitude, up to an altitude of at least 1, 000 km. The rate of increase depends 
on the object's source; thus, it is possible that the size distribution at higher altitudes 
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Figure 14. Summary of Best Measurements to Date. [Ref. 11, p. 146] 
Moreover, the projected future of the orbital debris population is not 
prom1smg. Several diagrams evidence growth in different ways. First, there is a 
historical increase of trackable objects, shown in Figure 15 by orbital regime, and in 
Figure 16 by originating country. Several models, in different scenarios, show the 
inevitable increase in the hazard posed by space debris. Figure 17 depicts a mathematical 
model of current debris flux for various sizes and altitudes. Figure 18 shows projected 
orbital debris flux under nominal environment and growth conditions. Consequently, 
there is a projected increase of objects down to the size of 1 em for the next 20 to 50 
years, without the added effects of interactive collisions. Figures 19, 20 and 21 show 
three different models that depict the long term evolution of debris greater than 1 em. All 
three show similar results under similar conditions. In Figure 19, linear rates refer to the 
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initial population of 1990, and compounded rates to the preceding year. [Ref. 2, p. 636] 
Figure 20 shows the evolution of the number of objects greater than 1 em in LEO [Ref. 2, 
p. 613]. Finally, Figure 21 shows the long term evolution of the population with and 
without objects less than 10 em in the basic population. Cumulatively, these diagrams 
show an increase from approximately 100,000 objects to approximately 500,000 objects 
within 50 years. As the number of objects increases, respective growth in the mass of 
objects in space also increases. Figure 22 illustrates the accumulation of mass in LEO 
and shows the projected accumulation of mass under various traffic scenarios. [Ref. 3, p. 
12] In closing, based on several different simulations and models, the projected outlook 
of the debris environment is undeniable: the continued growth of the debris problem is 
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Figure 22. Projected Growth of Accumulated Mass in LEO. [Ref. 3, p. 13] 
b. Degree of Uncertainty 
Each technique for measurement and subsequent modeling has a limit. They 
can be limited by the area and time of sampling, and limited as well by the sensitivity of a 
sensor. When the results of all sensors (models) are taken into account, a clearer 
understanding of the size distribution emerges. In general, there is a high degree of 
uncertainty in our knowledge about the current debris environment and our abiilty to 
develop accurate projections of the future environment. 
Experts caution that much uncertainty exists in our knowledge of the exact 
location, amount and size of debris, as well as how seriou::; the problem may become in 
the future. This uncertainty is caused by factors such as our limited ability to measure 
and actually validate the number and size of particles, a lack of predictability in the level 
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of future space activities, and the indeterminate causes of breakup events as major debris 
sources. 
Today, it is generally accepted that the LEO environment is adequately 
measured for orbital debris sizes larger than 1 0 em. Based on this data, the population 
density of the measured debris is known to an uncertainty factor of between two and five. 
However, for debris 0.01 em and below, there are no confirmed measurements. The 
estimates given here are based on a linear extrapolation which has an uncertainty factor of 
10. [Ref. 3, p. 5] 
The reader is asked to keep in mind this perennial degree of uncertainty 
involved with the debris problem. The factors described above, contributing to this 
uncertainty, affect every facet of the debris situation. The first factor, that of limited 
measurement capabilities, obviously affects our ability to determine exact numbers on 
debris. This lack of specificity is important because actions and predictions based on 
these limited measurements allow for a wide margin of error. The other two factors also 
have the same effect: to create a sense of uncertainty and doubt. From this, it is easy to 
see why debris simulations require many assumptions in order to present current and 
projected evolutionary scenarios. 
For instance, note Figure 23. It depicts a graphical representation of three 
case scenarios. Case 1 is "business as usual". That is, it assumes that the world launch 
rate remains at the current 100 launches a year. Case 2 assumes the same condition, but 
adds the assumption that all chemical explosions are eliminated by the year 2000. Case 3 
assumes the same conditions found in Case 2, but adds two conditions: by the year 2000, 
rocket bodies will be required to re-enter after payload delivery; and by 2030, payloads 
will be required to be removed from orbit after the end of their operational life. [Ref. 11, 
p. 146] This model relies heavily on one assumption: the future global launch rate. A 
change in this parameter would obviously have an impact on the output of the simulation. 
What if the world launch rate changes dramatically? Action taken based upon the 
preceding model would produce highly unsatisfactory results. In a recent Space News 
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article, a study was released showing an increased market for small satellites. Nearly 
doubling in size, the larger market inevitably means more launches and more possible 
sources of space debris. 
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Figure 23. Example of the Predicted Change in the Debris Environment Under Various 
Scenarious. [Ref. 11, p. 145] 
4. Sources of Orbital Debris 
In the course of this paper, some sources of debris have already been mentioned 
or implied. Figure 24 depicts a breakdown of some of the major causes for debris. In this 
section, four general categories of debris sources are investigated. 
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Figure 24. Causes of On-orbit Fragmentations and Debris. [Ref. 1, p. 23] 
a. Satellite Deterioration 
A little understood source of space debris is the gradual deterioration of old 
spacecraft and rocket bodies. This deterioration is the source of the very small objects 
alluded to earlier. 
Two of the major processes involved with the generation of this type of 
debris are atomic oxygen contamination and solar radiation levels. These two catalysts, 
atomic oxygen and radiation, combine to bring about the disintegration of spacecraft 
surfaces. Atomic oxygen is suspected of causing erosion of protective coatings, paints 
and composite structures in a spacecraft. Experiments flown on STS-5 and STS-8 show 
that atomic oxygen may be an even greater hazard to spacecraft than previously believed; 
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data suggests that graphite epoxy composite structures can lose up to 0.15 em of 
thickness within 30 years due to atomic oxygen alone. [Ref. 1, p. 12] 
Radiation may cause the breakdown of bonding compounds plus the 
embrittlement of protective thin films and coverings. Also, repeated heating by solar 
radiation can induce thermal stresses and result in structural failures of large satellites. 
b. Satellite Fragmentation 
Satellite fragmentation is the largest source of man-made space debris. It 
accounts for over 1/3 of all satellites in the catalog, and composes almost 112 of the 





Figure 25. Causes of Debris by Fragmentation. [Ref. 4, p. 478] 
As of today, nearly 130 satellites have fragmented in space since the first 
breakup, detected in 1961. Causes for satellite breakups have been categorized into three 
general groupings: those caused by deliberate actions, by accidental propulsion-related 
events, and by unknown causes. [Ref. 1, p. 13] This last group is the largest; it accounts 
for up to 45% of all fragmentations. [Ref. 3, p. 7] This unknown is a direct reflection of 
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our inability to select a single high probability cause for a satellite breakup. Figure 26 

















Figure 26. Rate of Satellite Fragmentations. [Ref. 1, p. 13] 





Operational debris is produced during nearly every stage of orbital 
operations. This includes launch vehicle staging and operations; payload separation; 
payload activation; payload operations; and payload de-orbits. Exclusive of 
fragmentation events, an average of three trackable objects are catalogued for every 
launch. For example, the KOSMOS 2048 produced eight pieces of debris: three pieces 
during payload separation and activation; three pieces during payload de-orbit 
preparation; and two pieces during payload de-orbit operations. [Ref. 6, p. 14] 
d. Solid Propellant Particles 
Another source of small particles is the operation of solid rocket motors, 
which are normally used as final transfer stages on GEO missions. Current solid rocket 
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technology often employs significant quantities of aluminum mixed with the propellant in 
order to dampen burn rate instabilities. However, during the burning process, large 
numbers of aluminum oxide particles are formed and ejected through a wide range of 
flight path angles at velocities up to 4 km/s. These particles are larger than 10 mm, but as 
many as 1,020 may be created during the firing of a single solid rocket motor! [Ref. 14, p. 
3-7] 
More recently, focus has been drawn to a potentially more dangerous 
side-effect of solid rocket motors. Ground tests indicate that a smaller number of 1 em or 
larger particles are also ejected during nominal burns. These particles, which have a 
lower characteristic velocity and smaller area-to-mass ratio, may be longer lived and may 
pose a greater threat than the smaller aluminum oxide particles. [Ref. 3] 
5. Sinks of Orbital Debris 
a. Environmental Forces Effecting Debris 
In general, the LEO environment benefits from the natural cleansing 
processes associated with its proximity to Earth; GEO to a lesser degree. Figure 27 
illustrates the number of cataloged satellite decays. 
Orbital decay is a natural sink for the removal of space debris and can be 
caused in three ways. The first is atmospheric drag, a phenomenon which has been 
alluded to previously. Below 500 km, the density of the atmosphere is sufficient to affect 
the orbital velocity of an object. At higher altitudes, atmospheric effects are less 
significant. The rate at which a satellite losses altitude is a function of its mass and its 
average cross-sectional area impinging on the atmosphere. [Ref. 14, p. 3-8] 
A second natural sink is solar-lunar perturbations. This type of sink is of 
primary importance to objects in highly elliptical orbits. Gravitational effects of the Sun 
and Moon produce forces that can cause the perigee of the orbit to either rise or fall. 
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Figure 28. Perigee Altitude History Affected by Lunar/Solar Cycles. [Ref. 9] 
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The third, and less prominent sink effect, is that of solar pressure on a 
satellite. In essence, striking photons cause orbiting objects to slow down. Obviously, 
the effect is negligible for large bodied objects; however, for particles of a few grams or 
less, it can induce rapid orbital decay. [Ref. 1, p.6] 
b. Retrieval and De-orbits 
Retrieval and de-orbiting are man-made methods of accomplishing the same 
goal as above. They both serve to remove payloads from their active orbits at the end of 
their operational lifetime. 
Of the two, de-orbiting is a preferred method; it is less difficult and less 
expensive than retrieval. De-orbiting is a feasible solution for payloads in LEO and 
GEO. De-orbiting of a satellite is a planned event; de-orbit considerations must be 
incorporated into the overall mission design from the beginning. Through a series of 
controlled bums or through the use of drag inducing devices, payloads are forced into a 
lower altitude that facilitates their eventual re-entry to Earth. In GEO, another option 
exists. Instead of de-orbiting towards the Earth, inactive satellites are boosted into higher 
orbits. This practice is called removing a satellite into a 'disposal' orbit. Preliminary 
studies indicate that the orbit needs to be raised on the order of 200 km in order to serve 
its intended purpose. Of course, both these options are expensive by nature; they require 
substantial amounts of propellant or fuel in order to properly execute. Cost effectiveness 
studies would be necessary in order to minimize associated costs with either technique. 
Retrieval is only reasonable for larger objects because of the necessary 
rendezvous maneuvers required. Essentially, satellites are physically removed from their 
orbit by means of a second spacecraft system or a remover device. The strategy for the 
removal of objects from Earth orbits will always consist basically of successive 
rendezvous and de-orbit maneuvers. Presently, this manner of removing satellites is only 
feasible for LEO objects, one at a time. Recent research is looking into the possibility of 
economically removing numerous large objects from orbit by means of energy transfers. 
The concept involves using space tethers for energy transfers; once an object is roped by 
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the tether of a remover device, the remover will climb to a higher altitude while the debris 
object will decay to a lower altitude. Through successive 'ropings', it would be possible 
to retrieve numerous large objects in a more economical manner. [Ref. 12, p. 197] Both 
these strategies are again discussed in Chapter IV. 
6. Debris Effects 
Space debris presents a complex issue. Description of the physical 
characteristics and processes of space debris, as well as our lack of precise measurements, 
confirm this. From a systems perspective, this complex problem suggests that there is a 
high degree of inter-relatedness between the many processes surrounding space debris. It 
would seem this is the very nature of space itself. What is implied, and was previously 
alluded to, is that most of the space debris issue revolves around cause-effect 
relationships. For instance, more satellites in space leads to overcrowding conditions in 
select orbits; the effect of this condition is the increased potential for collisions between 
objects. Or, the reverse is true; removing debris, by natural or man-made techniques, 
certainly causes less saturation of the environment and results in a lower probability of 
collision among objects. 
Having presented the various bits of information describing space debris, it is 
now appropriate to focus on what happens when it is all put together. To use an analogy, 
'snapshots', or pieces of a puzzle, have been presented. Now, focus on the outcomes after 
seeing the 'whole' picture; what do the sum of the parts equal? 
a. Hypervelocity Impacts 
This is something that has been alluded to all along: the danger of objects 
colliding with one another at high velocities. In the context of this paper, hypervelocity 
impacts are those impacts which describe collisions between objects in orbit. They are 
characterized by large explosive energies. Scientists are particularly interested m 
hypervelocity impacts occurring between the ranges of 7 to 15 km/sec; this IS 
representative of space debris induced collisions. Hypervelocity is operationally defined 




material appears to have flowed in a fluid or molten state to mold the final crater shape. 
Laboratory impacts into glass indicates that this requires impact speeds in excess of about 
7 km/s. [Ref. 12, p. 294] Under these conditions, a hypervelocity impact will generate a 
cloud of bumper and projectile debris that can contain solid fragments, liquid, or vapor 
particles. Dynamics of a hypervelocity impact are illustrated in Chapter IV. 
Impacts are at the very heart of the space debris issue. The threat of objects 
colliding in space is of utmost concern. Specifically, those collisions which may occur 
between a useful satellite and an orbiting piece of debris. Concerns are justly founded: 
given the energies associated with orbiting objects, even the smallest of debris particles 
affects satellites; larger pieces can utterly destroy a satellite. 
h. Collisional Cascading 
This is truly a vicious cycle of destruction. The theory stipulates that at the 
moment of critical population density, an irreversible chain reaction of collision events 
takes place creating increasing levels of space debris; the cycle is perpetuated as the 
creation of more debris particles creates more collisions, and so on, ad infinitum. Critical 
population density is reached when that population will produce fragments from random 
collisions at an increasing rate and at a rate that is greater than the rate of removal by 
natural processes. [Ref. 15] Refer to Figure 29. 
In 1978, collisional cascading was predicted to be an important source of new 
debris, possibly before the year 2,000. Some critics argue that collisional cascading is 
happening now. Dr. Kessler, from NASA's Johnson Space Center (JSC), concluded in a 
recent paper that analysis indicates that certain regions of low Earth orbit are already 
unstable. He claims that if nothing more is added to the unstable regions, the rate of 
debris growth will be slow, accounting for one collisional breakup per 10 to 20 years. If 
this is not the case, these unstable regions will expand, causing breakup rates to increase 
to every 2.5 to 5 years. [Ref. 15] Figure 30 shows the long term evolution of all objects 
greater than 1 em due to collisional cascading effects described by Dr. Kessler. 
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Figure 30. Long Term Evolution of All Objects> 1cm Due to Collision Cascading Effects. 
[Ref. 16, p. 8] 
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Figure 31 also shows an exponential increase of the population due to 
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Figure 31. Increase in Population Due to Collision Cascading Effects. [Ref. 17] 
c. Current Issues 
The problem of space debris is not as far removed from our daily lives as one 
would anticipate. Not only does space debris pose a hazard to satellites, but it has 
recently been noted that it is affecting the observational efforts of several astronomers. 
Space debris often corrupts celestial photographs with long exposure times. There have 
also been cases of confusion about whether an object under study is in actuality of 
scientific concern or a piece of debris. As the space debris population grows, so does its 
ability to retlect light. This has the end effect of causing sensitive instruments to 
malfunction or take erroneous readings. [Ref. 3, p. 14] 
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B. RECOGNIZING THE THREAT 
It appears to be that the greatest challenge in resolving the debris issue is the 
recognition of it as a genuine threat to present and future space activity. One of the major 
factors contributing to this misperception is the sheer immensity of space itself. 
By nature, mankind is perfectly adapted to recognize and respond to threats that 
come in the form of sudden, dramatic events. Today, primary threats to our collective 
well-being are slow, gradual developments arising from processes that are complex both 
in detail and in dynamic. [Ref. 18, p. 367] 
Such is the case with orbital debris. Failure to perceive the symptoms of this 
gradual development will have severe consequences affecting all facets of future space 
activities. Presently, there are several arguments which may influence one's perception of 
the space debris threat. 
1. The LEO Environment 
"Well, it's not that big a problem." Untrue; evidence has been provided to 
indicate that it is an issue of growing concern; the extent of which will be discussed in the 
next chapter. Consequently, danger to a spacecraft also increases. Figures 32 and 33 
corroborate this fact. Figure 32 shows the cumulative risk to a 2,000 m2 space vehicle 
over a 30 year period, due to the debris environment model flux of all objects larger than 
10 em. Figure 33 indicates a family of Monte Carlo runs for continuing present practices 
and launch rates. Note that there is a large uncertainty both as to when the process might 
start and as to how it might progress. [Ref. 2, p. 629] Nonetheless, despite these inherent 
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Figure 33. Monte Carlo Expectation of Collisions Among Satellites under Present 
Operating Practices. [Ref. 2, p. 629] 
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LEO debris objects are of paramount concern, because a greater threat exists at 
the LEO range of altitudes. This threat manifests itself in the following manner: more 
overcrowding conditions create a large possibility of collision, and collisions will be of a 
higher magnitude than in GEO. Also, the greatest relative velocities between orbiting 
objects occur at LEO. Since GEO velocities are lower, the danger of impact is smaller 
and the possible consequences are ofless immediate concern than in LEO. 
2. Implications: What's in Jeopardy 
"OK, we don't stand to lose anything of importance." Again, untrue. LEO 
contains a myriad of crucial military and commercial satellite services. Its accessibility 
and orbit characteristics provide several benefits to its users. Ongoing LEO missions 
include communication, navigation, meteorology and geodesy services. From a military 
perspective, surveillance, reconnaissance and attack warning capabilities exist. As one 
can imagine, the loss of any one of these to space debris could have a direct impact on 
everyone concerned. Loss of these satellites due to collisions seems very likely to occur. 
Again, simulations indicate that a fairly low collision rate may lead to a collision at a 
moderate confidence level within several decades. Figure 34 plots four curves that 
clearly quantify the effects of differing collision rates on the likelihood of a collision over 
time. [Ref. 20, p. 498] 
3. Historical Perspective 
"Hey, nothing's happened so far." In a meeting hosted by NASA JSC in 1982, a 
representative of a satellite operator clearly voiced this position: why should we worry 
about the space debris problem when in the last 25 years of experience no satellite has 
been known to have been seriously disabled by space debris [Ref. 1, p. 7]. Though he 
may have been correct, his assessment is short-sighted. Most experts agree that space 
debris currently poses only a slight hazard to space operations. However, all concur that 





















• dC/dt • 0.25 
o dC/dt-0.10 
" dC/dt = 0.05 
+ dC/dl "' 0.01 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Time (yrs) 
Figure 34. Current Predicted Collision Rate. [REf. 20, p. 498] 
Keep in mind the following: some of the causes for past satellite failures are still 
unknown. Of all the known satellite fragmentations, only the cause of 45% of them has 
been determined [Ref. 1, p. 22]. Although several possible reasons for these unexplained 
fragmentations exist, space debris as a cause cannot be discounted. For instance, one 
recent study points toward the likelihood that there has been at least one collision-induced 
breakup in LEO [Ref. 20, p. 499]. 
In another closely related argument, several from the space community argue 
that space debris should not be of pressing concern because past launch rate failures far 
exceed space debris related failures. From an economic perspective, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) relies on this argument to instead focus its resources into correcting 
launch related problems. In weighing the cost effectiveness versus the probability of 
collision, they find the effort to deal with space debris as not being worth it. Again, from 
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a historical view, this may be correct. However, the rationale behind the argument is 
flawed and very short-sighted. Conceivably, it could be too late to take action once space 
debris failures overcome launch rate failures. 
4. The Driving Force: Space Station 
So, why is space debris of such concern now? The truth to this question may 
include several possibilities. However, the one, single event that has caused this issue to 
come to light so quickly has undoubtedly been the construction of the international Space 
Station. The largest undertaking since the Apollo missions, the Space Station is 
mankind's next stepping stone into space. 
With the advent of the Space Station, space debris has come under greater 
scrutiny. Once constructed, the Space Station will orbit the Earth at an altitude of 
approximately 400 km and an inclination of 28.5 degrees. Concern for the Space Station 
is valid: the orbital debris environment in LEO presents a problem even now for space 
operations which involve large spacecraft or satellites in orbit for long periods of time 
[Ref. 3, p. 14]. At its proposed position, the Space Station will be in an area of great 
concern. In order to cope with this environment, it will be necessary to shield it over 
large areas in order to achieve the required design safety criteria. 
C. SUMMARY 
From the information and perspectives gleamed from above, some truths are 
starting to emerge. First, LEO is the worst orbit both in terms of debris distribution and 
population density. Also, when compared with GEO, higher velocities occur at these 
lower altitudes which in turn can cause larger impacts and subsequent satellite 
fragmentations. Next, less is known about GEO than LEO; this is due primarily to 
limited data gathering capabilities. However, what is known, from both orbits, is 
inaccurate to a certain degree. Lastly, and most importantly, the issue of space debris is a 
growing one; Figure 35 shows a historical increase in the number of objects in orbit, by 
size, over time. Present day practices and applications will exacerbate the problem in 
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accordance with all accepted model predictions. It is this aspect ofthe issue which makes 
space debris such a grave problem and a looming threat. In closing, given the 
characteristics of the debris environment, it can be said that orbital debris is a potential 
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Figure 35. Number of Objects in Orbit vs. Time. [Ref. 2, p. 347] 
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III. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM 
This chapter illustrates the current efforts regarding the space debris issue. As a 
result of the overwhelming evidence concerning the growing threat of space debris, all 
major space powers have established orbital debris research programs. The cornerstones 
of ongoing programs are highlighted herewith. 
A. POLICY AND LEGAL ISSUES 
To date, no international treaty or law regulates or constrains the creation of orbital 
debris. Most would argue that existing data on orbital debris are inadequate to support 
any definitive policy actions [Ref. 21, p. 408]. There are, however, two relevant UN 
sponsored space treaties in effect. They are known as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and 
the 1972 Liability Convention. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty is a treaty on the principles 
governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, to include the 
moon and other celestial bodies. From this treaty, the articles of most concern, with 
regards to orbital debris, are articles VI, VII and IX. In accordance with S. Neil 
Hosenball, former NASA General Counsel, these three articles can be applied to the 
orbital debris problem. Article VI claims that treaty signatories bear international 
responsibility for their national space activities, whether sponsored by their own 
government or by members from their private sector. Article VII establishes the principle 
that a signatory that launches or procures a launch of an object into space is 
internationally liable for damage caused by that object to another signatory. Article IX 
calls for signatories to be guided by the principles of cooperation and mutual assistance. 
Mr. Hosenball believes that the phrase "potentially harmful interference" can be applied 
to orbital debris [Ref. 9, p. 15]. As for the 1972 Liability Convention, it focused on the 
international liability for damage caused by space objects. From our perspective, it 
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elaborated on Article VII from the 1967 treaty. Specifically, it defined space objects as 
including component parts of spacecraft, their launch vehicles, and component parts of 
their launch vehicles. However, the agreement has a major caveat when fault is 
established as the basis of liability for damage between space objects. It is only 
applicable if the identity of both objects are unambiguous. Despite their shortcomings, 
these international agreements remain the most pertinent to the orbital debris issue. 
However, these preliminary space laws are not directly applicable to the orbital debris 
problem and have not been used to control the growth of space debris. 
1. International Consensus 
Despite the lack of an internationally sponsored agreement on the space debris 
problem, there are several ongoing efforts by individual countries' space agencies. It 
appears that where international law efforts have failed, cooperative agreements among 
several state space agencies have succeeded. Through several informal, 
non-governmental meetings, these major space-faring organizations have focused on 
effons to pursue an international code of conduct which helps to minimize the production 
of new debris. They accomplish this by concentrating on technical rather than regulatory 
issues, and by developing accepted debris mitigation practices. Through their efforts, the 
community's needs are better served than by current international law. These 
organizations realize that concerns are international in scope and actions to control the 
growth of debris must be taken now. 
2. us 
The US has taken the lead on the issuance of space debris policy. In 1988, 
President Reagan signed the National Space Policy. In it, he included a statement that 
"all space sectors will seek to minimize the creation of space debris. Design and 
operations of space tests, experiments and systems will strive to minimize or reduce 
accumulation of space debris consistent with mission requirements and cost 
effectiveness" [Ref. 3, p. 17]. In 1989, there was an addendum to the National Space 
Policy; it called for the US. government to encourage other space-faring nations to adopt 
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policies and practices aimed at debris minimization. This policy expands the 1987 DoD 
policy, discussed below, applying it not only to the national security sector but to civil 
space activities as well. With the exception of these two statements, no comprehensive 
national policy concerning orbital debris presently exists [Ref. 3, p. 17]. 
There are no comprehensive agency policies or commercial regulations 
considering orbital debris either. However, there are some limited policy statements and 
regulating mechanisms which address some debris considerations in both the commercial 
and government sectors of America's space program. 
a. NASA 
NASA is at the vanguard of the orbital debris issue. What little has been 
accomplished to establish international debris minimization techniques or raising the 
general public's awareness into the problem, has been a direct result of NASA's untiring 
efforts. Since 1981, it has taken concrete steps towards minimizing the creation of 
additional debris in space. Then, NASA established a ten year, three pronged strategy for 
addressing the orbital debris issue: a technical approach, a measurements approach and a 
policy approach. And, in 1982, it established a venting policy. Specifically, it called for 
the venting of Delta upper stages; by releasing unspent gases and propellants, a potential 
explosion is defused. Since then, no hypergolic, that is, the oxidizer and the fuel ignite 
upon contact, stages have inadvertently exploded in space. Also, during the same year, 
NASA sponsored the first ever NASA Workshop on orbital debris at Johnson Space 
Center. Aside from creating various recommendations regarding the debris issue, this 
workshop showed to the world that there was a community of interest in the orbital debris 
problem [Ref. 3, p. 18]. 
More recently, NASA has commenced to address the issue by working 
closely with the DoD. In 1990, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
(AIAA) sponsored a NASA/DoD orbital debris conference in Baltimore. Again, several 
papers were presented highlighting the need to address the debris situation [Ref. 9, p. 65]. 
In the same year, NASA and DoD began joint orbital debris studies as stipulated by the 
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Interagency Group (Space) report from 1989. The goal was to characterize the LEO 
debris environment down to 1 em and to identify candidate technologies for minimizing 
debris production and enhancing spacecraft survivability. They also began work on a 
guide for spacecraft builders and launch operators, tentatively titled, Space Debris 
Minimization and Mitigation Handbook [Ref. 3]. 
In summary, NASA's policy to limit orbital debris generation grew out of the 
Presidential directive in 1988. Currently, a handbook is being developed to support 
NASA Management Instruction (NMI) 1700.8, which is a general policy statement 
limiting the generation of orbital debris. This handbook defines design and operations 
techniques for limiting the generation of debris, provides support to help developing 
programs establish conformance to the policy, and supports the assessment of 
effectiveness of debris mitigation procedures [Ref. 22, p. 1]. 
b. DoD 
DoD is an emergmg advocate of the growing dangers of orbital debris. 
Presently, DoD's space policy supports and amplifies US national space policy. To this 
effect, DoD has taken several steps towards addressing the debris issue. 
In 1987, DoD issued its first official orbital debris policy. It states that "DoD 
will seek to minimize the impact of space debris on its military operations. Design and 
operations of DoD space tests, experiments and systems will strive to minimize or reduce 
accumulation of space debris consistent with mission requirements." [Ref. 9, p. 53] By 
all accounts, this policy broke new ground because it specifically identified space debris 
as a planning factor in future military space operations. 
Component services have also implemented guidance concemmg space 
debris. In 1991, USSPACECOM issued regulation 57-2, Minimization and Mitigation of 
Space Debris; it delineates responsibilities and lists guidelines for the operation and 
development of current and future space systems with regards to space debris mitigation 
activities. [Ref. 23, p. 1] From another perspective, Air Force regulation SDR 55-1 
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directs program directors and managers to adjust satellite development and deployment 
plans to avoid orbital positioning problems [Ref. 3, p. 18]. 
Ongoing research efforts are also a major portion of DoD space debris policy. 
In response to the Interagency Group report of 1989, DoD has established a two phased 
Space Debris Research Program. As of October 1991, participants in the program 
included the Air Force Space Command, Air Force Systems Command, the Strategic 
Defense Initiative Organization, and the Defense Nuclear Agency. Phase I, a near term 
plan for FY 90-92, included goals such as the assessment of the orbital debris 
environment, development of Space Station Freedom design criteria, documentation of 
debris minimization procedures and practices, provision of design concept studies and 
tool development for spacecraft debris survivability, and continued support for the 
development of standards, national policy, and international agreements. Phase II, the 
long term portion of the program, encompasses FY 93 and on. Its main objective is to 
implement improvements, procedures and practices required to meet user needs. 
Although the program is making considerable headway [Ref. 4], some issues and 
concerns have been highlighted. Of most importance is the fact that there is no formally 
assigned DoD lead agency in the program; the Air Force is acting as a "de facto" leader. 
This limits the ability to provide overall program coordination, speak with one voice, and 
avoid duplication of efforts. 
3. Other Space Organizations 
Other state space agencies have followed in the wake of NASA's lead. Two of 
the foremost contributors to research into the space debris predicament are highlighted. 
Their driving concern: the problem cannot be resolved without international unity and 
cooperation. 
As previously mentioned, technical experts are developing methods for reducing 
the quantity of space debris and advocating voluntary restraint rather than legal 
regulation. States involved in the use and exploration of outer space are developing 
policies to address the question of space debris management. These organizations are 
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also studying the technical, economic, legal and policy aspects of space debris [Ref. 25, p. 
1]. 
a. European Space Agency (ESA) 
Europe's concern with the orbital debris issue is highlighted in a paper 
presented by various international scientists at the World Space Congress held from 28 
August through 5 September 1992 in Washington, D.C. It agreed on six major actions to 
be taken by the international community at large: the underlying theme to all was an 
urgent need to act now and the incorporation of mitigation practices [Ref. 26]. 
Through similar efforts, ESA is assuming a major role in the quest for 
international recognition and commitment to debris awareness and mitigation practices. 
Since 1986, with the creation ofthe Space Debris Working Group (SDWG), ESA began 
the assessment of the various issues of space debris. From SDWG recommendations, 
ESA's council formulated and adopted a policy on space debris with the objectives of 
minimizing the creation of space debris. It also approved a plan of activities [Ref. 2, p. 
27]. The main element of the ongoing research activities is the Space Debris Research 
Program. Similar to the DoD Research program, it looks to study critical areas of the 
space debris issue and carry out preparations for future programs in a two phased plan. 
ESA's plan to cope with the debris problem relies heavily on international cooperation. 
They believe that space debris is a global problem which can only be solved by a joint 
effort, discussions and cooperation with other space agencies and related organizations 
must be further enhanced [Ref. 2, p. 31]. 
b. National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA) 
By their own accounts, NASDA's orbital debris achievements are still very 
limited compared with those of the USA and Europe [Ref. 9, p. 79]. However, as an 
emerging space power, their efforts and commitment to the issue are well founded. 
As with most other countries, no national guidelines on the issue have been 
formulated [Ref. 27, p. 1]. In light of this situation, and partly due to NASA's initiatives, 
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they too have founded a Space Debris Study Group. The objectives of the group are to 
promote overall space debris related research, to stimulate public awareness of this issue, 
and to provide guidelines to cope with it. Actual changes in policy have taken effect 
within NASDA as a result of the group's recommendations and other sources. It has 
implemented blow dovvn and depletion bum of residual propellant of H-1 second stage, 
residual pressure in helium bottles and gas jet residual propellant [Ref. 27, p. 6]. 
NASDA's efforts are to be commended. Their early incorporation of space 
debris research into their overall space effort reflects highly on their commitment as a 
responsible space user. All this, despite no Japanese space projects being known to have 
created a large amount of debris. 
4. Summary 
The international space community is taking positive steps regarding the space 
debris problem in the absence of any international law or treaty. Through their collective, 
responsible efforts, the threat of space debris is being marginally addressed. In April of 
1993, the four major space powers - ESA, NASDA, NASA and the Russian Space 
Agency (RKA)- met in Darmstadt, Germany for multi-lateral talks on space debris. The 
four agencies decided on formal terms of reference and a working group structure. They 
agreed to exchange technical information and experience in the context of a Space Debris 
Coordination Committee. To most in the orbital debris community, this gathering is the 
culmination of consciousness-raising activities in the international arena [Ref. 9, p. 93]. 
Despite these accomplishments, several issues of a legal nature remain 
unresolved; particularly anything having to do with the legal definition of space debris, a 
state's responsibilities and liabilities involving space debris, and just compensation in the 
event of a debris collision with an active satellite. Presently, these issues have not been 
addressed on a global level [Ref. 2, p. 683]. 
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B. MODELING 
Modeling of the space debris problem is another yardstick by which to measure the 
commitment of international space agencies to the issue of orbital debris. In the context 
of the debris issue, orbital debris modeling is a cornerstone to any space agency's debris 
research effort. Modeling activities are generally concerned with interpreting what can be 
directly measured in terms of what one would like to know. They are required both to fill 
in the gaps in the data and to project the future situation. 
Modeling for the space debris issue can be summarized into three general 
categories: support models, evolutionary models and engineering models. Support 
models address specific problems such as orbit lifetime and debris stability. They apply 
environment models and measurements to specific problems such as debris environment 
characterization related to penetrability and predicting debris detection rates. Examples 
of this type of modeling include breakup models, orbit lifetime models, area-to-mass 
models, critical density models, LDEF related models, traffic models, flux models and 
flux directionality models. Evolutionary models are those that model a system through 
evolutionary scenarios. The model allows for a simple treatment of the gross features of 
environment evolution yet is consistent with expectations based on physical arguments. 
NASA's EVOLVE model is an example of an evolutionary model. Lastly, engineering 
models are those that incorporate results from models and measurements to produce a 
description of the environment which can be used by spacecraft designers [Ref. 28]. 
1. Orbital Debris Modeling 
Orbital debris modeling is necessary because detailed knowledge of all 
man-made space objects has become important for present and future spaceflight. It is 
essential to know their size and mass distribution, and their altitude and inclination 
distribution in order to assess the collision risk for any new launch, to design shielding 
against the small particle flux and to study the feasibility of collision avoidance 
maneuvers [Ref. 12, p. 81]. 
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There is an extensive orbital debris environment modeling activity supported by 
NASA/JSC; Figure 36 illustrates ongoing orbital debris modeling efforts. Initially, no 
models existed and most of NASA's orbital debris funding was directed towards the 
development of a modeling capability. Now, orbital debris models are being used to 
routinely support NASA's activities and programs. For instance, NASA's EVOLVE 
program is a detailed environment evolution model currently applied to LEO. It uses 
breakup models to determine the distribution of fragmentation debris created by 
collisions and explosions, and it uses historical records of launch traffic and mission 
models for future launch traffic as input data. It defines the debris environment as a time 
varying ensemble of objects in specific orbits. This particular model has been checked by 
comparing its results with observed environment characteristics. This is important, since 
a model can only be considered as accurate as when validated against measured data [Ref. 
2]. 
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Figure 36. Orbital Debris Modeling in NASA. [Ref. 2, p.8] 
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2. Accuracy of Models: Validation 
If perfect means of detection and tracking for space debris objects existed, 
mathematical models of the debris population would be unnecessary. However, as will 
be discussed later, this is not the case. Thus, models will always be necessary because 
measured data is incomplete and will always be incomplete; and because if only 
measured data of all orbital debris objects were available, it would represent only the 
current situation. There would be no room for simulations and future projections under 
various scenarios. Given the overall importance of models, models of an environment or 
a process must be tested empirically for accuracy and predictability. Most environmental 
models are validated against the Haystack radar observations or the USSP ACECOM 
catalog. 
From our example, EVOLVE's comparison with the USSPACECOM catalog has 
indicated that the debris environment is being modeled well to debris sizes of 1 0 em and 
larger; however, EVOLVE has more debris in the size range of 10 em to 1 meter (m) than 
the catalog. When compared with Haystack data, it was found that the debris 
environment model needs to be improved for debris to sizes as small as 1 em. 
Despite these validations, there will always be a degree of uncertainty associated 
with all models. For instance, there is a significant amount of uncertainty with current 
debris environment as determined by NASA/JSC. See Figure 37. At 400 km, the flux for 
particles below 1 em have uncertainties well over an order of magnitude [Ref. 6, p. 146]. 
3. Summary 
All of the major space powers have established orbital debris modeling activities 
into their space debris research programs. Their collective objectives in developing these 
models are to insure continued support of orbital debris related activities and major 
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Figure 37. Uncertainty in Current Environment at 400km Compared to NASA's TM 100-471 
Model. [Ref. 6, p. 146] 
As with any modeling attempt, certain baseline assumptions have been made 
with most orbital debris models: assumptions have been made concerning debris source 
and solar activity. Uncertainties in all models derive from observational limitations, 
unmodeled sources, and unpredictable solar activity [Ref. 3, p. 11]. 
C. MEASUREMENT 
Monitoring of the space debris environment is an important facet to any debris 
research program. Measurement of the debris environment can be made by either direct 
or indirect methods; that is, through observation using radar and optical systems, or 
through the analysis of returned space objects. Since no foreign country, with the 
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exception of the former Soviet Union, has a major capability for tracking satellites and 
orbital debris, measurement efforts will focus primarily on US capabilities. Figure 38 
summarizes ongoing and projected orbital debris measurement undertakings. 
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Figure 38. Ongoing and Proposed NASA Measurement Activities. [Ref. 2, p. 9] 
1. Maintaining a Catalog 
The primary data source for analyses of the measured Earth satellite population 
is the USSPACECOM's satellite catalog. Within the US, the Space Surveillance Network 
(SSN), operated primarily by DoD, is tasked to monitor man-made objects in space. 
Initially, the primary reason for having established USSPACECOM's space surveillance 
and tracking mission was for it to be able to distinguish between benign satellites and 
incoming ballistic missiles. Given the current debris situation, this simple task has turned 
into an enormous effort. Every day over 40,000 individual observations are made by 
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USSP ACECOM using both a space-based constellation of geosynchronous launch 
detection sensors and a ground-based network of sensors. However, these space-based 
sensors provide no observation for space surveillance; they focus on data collection of 
launches. Each observation is forwarded to USSP ACECOM's Space Surveillance Center 
(SSC) in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. There, the observations are checked against the 
entire satellite catalog to determine if each represents a known or an unknown object. 
This satellite catalog is the most important tool for space surveillance; it is 
essential to space control operations. The catalog enables USSP ACECOM to predict 
possible collisions between satellites in Earth orbit. It also allows the command to 
predict when objects will start to reenter the Earth's atmosphere. In general, the catalog is 
maintained via the SSC. The SSC tasks the SSN to use the satellite catalog to track 
satellites; the sse then takes the observations and updates the satellite catalog. 
The satellite catalog includes a database that is used to chart the current position 
of Earth orbiting satellites and predict their future orbit paths. The catalog dates from 
1957, when Sputnik was launched. The catalog contains two types of information: 
administrative data and orbital parameter information [Ref. 12, p. 220]. 
Sensors that support the space surveillance mission are located around the world. 
Today, some twenty six sensor systems make up the USSPACECOM SSN; refer to 
Figure 39. Presently, USSPACECOM is not required to track and maintain orbit 
predictions on small debris; that is, on objects less than 10 em. According to a recent 
study, if the SSN were to be tasked to track objects smaller than 10 em, more sensors, 
communications lines and computers would be required [Ref. 12, p. 226]. 
2. Surface Capabilities 
a. General 
The network used by the SSC uses several types of sensors including 
mechanical tracking radar, tracking telescopes and phased array radar. Table 2 lists 
available ground-based sensors and their characteristics [Ref. 12, p. 225]. The capability 
of sensors to track is a fixed function of their total sensor tracking opportunities. It 
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should be noted that most of the sensors indicated are corollary or collateral assets and 
not dedicated to space surveillance. Only the facilities at Eglin Air Force Base, FL and 
NAVSPASUR are dedicated to space surveillance; the others are tasked on an "as 









-eo Li _L_j_.J._....!_...!._.L_L..J__!........!.___!_-L._;_....!-_:__.L-.L_.!.........;L-.....i___!..~--L......J 
360 
Figure 39. World Locations of SSN Sensors. [Ref. 29] 
USSP ACECOM has three component commands: Army Space Command 
(USARSPACE), Naval Space Command (NAVSPACECOM) and Air Force Space 
Command (AFSP ACECOM). Each component contributes organic assets in order to 
accomplish USSP ACECOM's mission. USARSPACE provides support through two 
space surveillance sensors contributing to the USSP ACECOM satellite catalog. These 
sensors are called ARP A-Lincoln Tracking and Identification Radar (ALTAIR) and the 
ARPA-Lincoln Coherent Observables Radar (ALCOR). NAVSPACECOM's 
contribution includes sensors from the oldest space surveillance system still in use, the 
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Naval Space Surveillance System (NAVSPASUR) Fence. This sensor creates an 
electronic barrier across the southern US. at approximately 33 degrees north latitude. Its 
three transmitters and six receivers provide coverage to an altitude of 15,000 nautical 
miles (27,780 Km). Finally, AFSPACECOM provides twenty-five worldwide sites to 
USSPACECOM to support space surveillance [Ref. 12, p. 218]. 
TABLE 2. SSN SENSOR CAPABILITIES. [REF. 12, P. 225] 





ALGOR Kwajalein Atoll C Band 5,555 km 
ALTAIR Kwajalein Atoll UHFNHF 40,000 km 
FPQ-14 Antiqua lis C Band 2,300 km 
FPQ-15 Ascension lis C Band 1,600 km 
FPS-92 Clear, AK UFH 5,555 km 
HAYSTACK Millstone Hill, MA X Band 35,000 km 
COBRA DANE Shemya lis LBand 5,555 km 
FPS-85 Eglin, Fl UHF ** 
FPS-49 Fylingdales, UHF 5,555 km 
England 
NAVSPASUR Dahlgren, VA Continuous Wave 8,100 km 
FPQ-14 Kaena Point, HI C Band 1,800 km 
MILLSTONE Millstone Hill, MA L Band 35,000 km 
FPS-79 Pirinclik, Turkey UHF 4,300 km 





AMOS Maui, HI Visible, LWIR 35,000 km 
GEODSS Socorro. NM Visible 35,000 km 
Taegu, Korea .. 
Maui, HI 
Diego Garcia 
MOTIF Maui, HI Visible, LWIR 35,000 km 
SITU St Margarets. Visible 35,000 km 
Canada 
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There are several types of radar in use by USSPACECOM. For instance, 
mechanical tracking radars generally have only one tracking beam. These types of radar 
do not have the means to track objects smaller than 10 em. Additionally, these radars do 
not have time to track objects such as small debris; they are used primarily to track large 
objects such as rocket bodies and active payloads. There are also tracking telescopes 
available. These telescopes also have a single object tracking capability. Depending on 
atmospheric conditions and visibility, they are capable of tracking small debris. But, 
similar to mechanical tracking radar, these telescopes are used primarily for other 
tracking missions and have no time for small debris. Lastly, there are phased array radar 
which can functionally use more than one tracking beam and can therefore track more 
objects simultaneously. Only a few of these radar have the inherent capability of tracking 
small debris less than 10 em in size. Sensors that could support this type of tasking are 
those found at Cavalier and Eglin. 
There has been much concern recently over the limitations of the sensors used 
by USSP ACECOM. Given the threat and predicted populations of debris objects of 10 
em or less, these shortcomings may prove disastrous. As one USSPACECOM official 
put it: "Bottom line is this. If the catalog doubles, there are few sensors that have 
available tracking opportunities to handle this. One would expect that the phased arrays 
of the existing SSC network should be able to handle it. However, if the catalog 
increases on the order of tenfold, then new tracking sensors will probably be required" 
[Ref. 12, p. 224]. 
Figure 40 shows USSPACECOM's tracking capabilities and highlights the 
resolutions at different altitudes. From this figure, one can see that any object smaller 
than 8 em cannot be reliably tracked by the SSN; the smallest fragment that can be 
measured at altitudes greater than 1000 km is approximately 10 em in diameter. Partial 
reason for this limitation is due to the resolution capabilities of SSN radar, as shown in 
Figure 41. Since no object can be catalogued unless two or more sensors track an object, 
the overall capability of the network is less than their best radar. 
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Figure 41. Sensor Resolution. [Ref. 1, p. 28] 
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There are other means of procuring accurate data through sensors outside the 
USSPACECOM network. Unlike the sensors in the SSN, these sensors were not built 
with another task in mind. That is, most SSN sensors were not designed to track small 
debris; they were built to track large, metallic ballistic missiles. Several proposals have 
been put forth by the international space community. For instance, from the Netherlands, 
the thought of using the Infrared Astronomical Satellite IRAS to perform a sky survey at 
1 0 to 1 00 urn wavelengths has been proposed. Radar measurements of small debris has 
also been proposed by using the Arecibo and Goldstone radar. Lastly, the Mu radar, a 
high powered VHF Doppler radar, from Japan has been considered to conduct orbital 
debris measurements. The majority of these newer radars are better equipped to handle 
the smaller radar cross sectional area presented by small debris sizes [Ref. 12, p. 
245-263]. 
b. Increasing Current Capabilities 
As we have seen, the radar frequencies and corresponding wavelengths 
required to accomplish the SSN's current mission are different than those required to 
efficiently detect smaller objects; as well as a sensor's beam width and power. To detect 
smaller objects, certain radar, would have to be significantly modified; a process that 
would make sensor's unavailable for their primary mission. 
As the Intergroup Agency report on space debris pointed out, there exists 
much room for improvement. Several options are available to improve the detection, 
tracking and monitoring capabilities of the SSN. The technology exists to allow 
USSPACECOM to increase the number of objects which can be catalogued. 
A combination of several approaches exist. These include modifications to 
existing ground-based sensors, development of space-based surveillance and new data 
management and data processing concepts. Recommendations include: 
(1) Using the Debris Environment Characterization Radar (DECR). By using this 
narrow beam radar, the debris population in LEO could be physically defined. 
61 
(2) Increasing power on existing collateral radar. By increasing the power output of a 
radar, its detection capability will be consequently increased. 
(3) Employing the MIT/Lincoln Laboratory small object identification. By using the 
Haystack radar, the same results obtained with a DECR could be produced. 
(4) Use ofthe Reentering Debris Radar (REDRAD). This could be used to determine 
the rate of elimination of debris from the environment. 
(5) Exploiting other domestic or foreign radar. 
(6) Development of space-based debris radar. 
(7) Expanding existing optical sensor capabilities [Ref. 3]. 
Unfortunately, most of these suggestions include a large price tag. Studies 
have concluded that improvement of existing sensors in order to track smaller sized 
debris is cost prohibitive. Currently there are no plans to upgrade any of the sensors 
within the SSN [Ref. 5]. 
3. Returned Material Analysis 
In addition to ground and space-based sensors, opportunities for direct 
examination and analysis of surfaces exposed to the LEO debris environment have been 
possible upon their return from space. As a result of both active and passive in-situ 
experiments, retrieved material analysis from space provides additional insight into the 
debris environment. Spacecraft exposed to the LEO environment for a long period of 
time are more than likely to have encountered impacting meteoroid and debris particles. 
Evaluation of these hypervelocity impact features provide information on the size 
distribution, composition and source of smaller debris particles. 
Currently, space debris particles smaller than a few millimeters cannot be 
detected using remote measurement techniques described above. The only method to 
accomplish this is with in-situ techniques. In all current systems, the extent of the 
environment measured and the statistical validity of the data obtained are both dependent 
on the total exposed area of a spacecraft. Until recently, all in-situ debris environment 
data were provided solely using passive techniques. In passive techniques, samples of 
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materials are exposed in space and then returned to Earth. There, the resulting craters or 
impacts are examined, measured and interpreted into particle diameters and impact 
velocities. 
Two recent observations have arisen in two opportunities of major importance. 
These are the return of approximately 3 square meters of space-exposed surfaces from the 
repair of the Solar Max satellite after 4.15 years in space, and the January 1990 return of 
130 square meters of exposed surface from the LDEF after 5.7 years in space. To a lesser 
degree, information concerning debris impacts is also obtained from returned shuttle 
flights. Although no intensive effort has been established to carefully study the Shuttle 
windows for debris impacts, they are examined after each flight for impacts and other 
damage that could compromise safety for the following mission. 
The returned Solar Max satellite has been a major source of new data on the 
small debris and meteoroid population for sizes below 0.01 em. After analysis, it was 
determined that the major source for these small particles result from the disintegration of 
painted surfaces of spacecraft and the firing of solid rocket motors in space [Ref. 2, p. 
195]. 
The LDEF, the first active in-situ experiment, has also provided a unique 
opportunity for the in-situ study of the many processes involved with orbital debris and 
upon high velocity impacts of such. From the crater size distribution, a comprehensive 
description of the actual particulate LEO population has been possible. Also, the analysis 
of the morphology of individual impact craters on the surface provides a method for 
determination of the direction of the impacting particles. It was discovered that orbital 
debris were dominant on spacecraft surfaces facing the velocity vector [Ref. 2, p. 159]. 
D. SUMMARY 
Often, the manner in which a person reacts speaks volumes. For instance, given a 
low threat situation, one is more than likely to ignore the problem and continue about 
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their routine business. However, the same cannot be said given a high threat condition: a 
person will act differently because the threat is of larger concern to their well-being. 
In continuing this analogy, the same can be said of orbital debris. How the world 
and the scientific community react tells one that orbital debris is indeed a matter of grave 
concern. The ongoing efforts and activities in the policy, technical, and measurement 
aspects of space debris research clearly support this position. Orbital debris is a new 
reality facing all space faring nations; it is a threat of great concern to the collective 
well-being of the international space community. 
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IV. SPACE DEBRIS STRATEGIES 
The previous chapters have served to educate and heighten one's awareness 
concerning the space debris issue. By this time, the reader has more than likely realized 
that debris poses a threat to current and future space activities, and is of great concern to 
the space community. The reason it has become of great concern is because of the threat 
debris poses to the survivability of space assets. A solution to the debris problem is as 
complex as the problem itself. In order to be effective, strategies must be developed to 
simultaneously decrease the dangers of the debris environment and cope with the current 
threat that the environment poses to spacecraft. This chapter explores several methods 
for accomplishing this goal; it presents feasible solutions to the problem. These strategies 
focus on LEO techniques. Advantages and limitations of each approach are examined. 
A. MINIMIZING DEBRIS GENERATION 
The practice of minimizing debris generation is a crucial step to controlling the 
debris environment. There are options available to control, limit, or reduce the growth of 
orbital debris. However, none of them can significantly modify the current debris 
environment. They can only influence the future condition ofthe environment. 
We have seen that man-made debris represents a collision hazard to active 
satellites. Small, untrackable particles can collide with spacecraft at hyper-velocities and 
cause catastrophic damage. The probability of a collision between large objects, 1 m or 
larger, is very low [Ref. 12, p. 180]. But, collisions between small particles and large 
particles are more likely and the source of a growing debris population. Also, it has been 
presented that, a steady increase of the number of objects in LEO will always lead to a 
chain reaction of collisions. If spaceflight activities are continued as in the past, the 
critical population mentioned by Dr. Kessler could be reached within the next few 
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decades. Thus, in any event, the Earth orbiting population must be limited in any case, 
because a steady increase will lead to worsening conditions. 
The control of orbital debris can be approached as a problem of either correction or 
prevention. Corrective approaches include efforts to retrieve derelict spacecraft and 
sweeper devices to remove small debris. Preventive measures call for provisions for 
self-removal of spacecraft and rocket bodies, and the increased use of reusable space 
hardware. Furthermore, three generic options of debris control can be identified: 
mitigation options, disposal or elimination of orbital debris objects, and active removal or 
cleaning activities. 
1. Current Trends 
Most current trends focus on limited mitigation practices and some disposal 
efforts through de-orbiting. 
a. Design Procedures 
Presently, current hardware and ongoing activities have occasionally been 
modified for debris prevention. A few design efforts, however, have included 
debris-prevention objectives from the start. Three to be exact. These are the Space 
Station, RADARSAT and IRIDIUM. 
Not only has the Space Station design team been looking at options to prevent 
the creation of orbital debris, but also at methods to protect the station from debris and to 
avoid contamination of the surrounding environment. RADARSAT, a Canadian remote 
sensing satellite in a polar LEO, ·is another example of the incorporation of debris 
environment considerations into the overall design philosophy of a satellite. Among 
other activities, to be discussed later, RADARSA T considered several mitigation options. 
It considered de-orbiting the satellite after its useful life, and adhered to the practice that 
there would be no hardware items cast loose into space during either the spacecraft 
separation or release of its extendible Small Aperture radar and solar arrays [Ref. 32, p. 
17]. Lastly, IRIDIUM, one of several proposed LEO communications constellations with 
worldwide coverage, is one of the first to implement a comprehensive program for debris 
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mitigation. It will be implemented during the design phase and will be continued through 
the operations phase. Highlights of their efforts include selection of orbits to decrease 
collision hazards, de-orbiting of their spent spacecraft and minimizing debris associated 
with insertion and deployment. These three examples illustrate the commitment to debris 
mitigation practices. They also highlight another characteristic associated with mitigation 
activities; that is, implementation of mitigation practices must occur at the earliest phases 
of a program. 
b. Operational Procedures 
Some operational procedures have already been adopted by various agencies 
in order to minimize debris generation. Interestingly, these procedures have occurred on 
an ad-hoc basis and were not due to any formal international agreement. Operational 
procedures to reduce the growth of debris occur via several different methods and 
practices. Generally, they fall into one of two categories: those associated with mission 
operations, and testing operations in space. 
Debris mitigation practices have been incorporated in mission operations for 
both launch vehicles and for payloads. To avoid spontaneous explosions, upper stage 
modifications have been made to existing rockets; such as the US Delta, the Japanese 
H-1, and the European Ariane rockets. In June of 1993, the Chinese Launch Vehicle 
System Design and Research Institute announced that the upper stage of the Long March 
4 rocket is being redesigned to make it less likely to explode in orbit. Additionally, 
venting procedures have been incorporated into some space agency operating procedures. 
By venting the oxidizer remaining in the stage after it reaches its intended orbit, 
inadvertent explosions can be prevented. Other examples of mitigation practices, 
particularly from NASA, include pre-launch and on-orbit planning considerations; 
Collision Avoidance on Launch (COLA) and Computation of Miss Between Orbits 
(COMBO) programs are routinely accomplished for each Shuttle mission. 
Similar procedures have been adopted in testing efforts in space, primarily in 
military-related testing. Previously, testing was conducted without great concern to the 
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impact their actions caused to the space environment, such as with the Midas 4 satellite 
[Ref. 9, p. 4]. In 1961, the US Air Force deployed a spinning 35 kilogram canister into 
orbit at 3220 km in support of Project West Ford. The canister holds 350 million hair like 
copper dipole antennas, the West Ford Needles. They are meant to scatter along Midas 
4's orbit, forming an 8 km wide by 40 km deep belt around the Earth. Other examples of 
this disregard have included past Anti-Satellite (ASA T) weapon testing. DoD has 
changed to some extent the manner in which they perform national defense related 
testing. Through their own past experience in creating space debris, DoD has 
acknowledged that accumulation of debris can be minimized through careful planning. 
This attitude seems to prevail to date. For instance, the Delta 180 SDI was planned in 
such a way as to ensure the least amount of debris proliferation. By conducting the test at 
a lower altitude, DoD assured that all test-related debris re-entered the Earth's atmosphere 
within 6 months [Ref. 3, p. 31]. 
Although most of these practices are voluntary and implemented in a 
decentralized and limited manner, these actions have already had a positive impact on the 
debris environment [Ref. 3, p. 31]. For instance, the rate of increase of orbital debris 
from US sources has dropped 15% because of the Delta modifications alone. Continued 
implementation of these practices can only suggest a lowering of the probability of 
collisional hazards and removal of additional debris sources. Figure 42 shows the 
effectiveness of preventive measures and of subsequent active removal of large objects 
from high altitudes [Ref. 2, p. 602]. 
2. Options for the Future 
Figure 43 highlights ongoing orbital debris mitigation efforts. In discussing this 
section, future influence of the debris environment can be categorized into three generic 
option groups; they overlap and are similar to the current protective and corrective 
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Mitigation options include those measures such as booster and payload 
design, the prevention of spontaneous explosions of rocket bodies and spacecraft, and the 
research and application of "particle free" propellants. 
Litter-free spacecraft operations could be achieved by combining design and 
operational practices. Launch vehicles and spacecraft can be designed to dispose of 
separation devices, payload shrouds and other expendable hardware at low enough 
altitudes and velocity so as not to become orbital. Also, stage separation devices and 
spacecraft protective devices such as lens covers can be kept captive to the stage or 
spacecraft with lanyards or other means in order to minimize debris. 
When stages and spacecraft do not have the capability to de-orbit, they must 
be designed to become as inert as possible after their lifetime. Some of these measures 
have already been discussed, such as expelling all hypergolic propellants and pressurants; 
or insuring that batteries are protected from spontaneous explosions. Either effort would 
require modifications in design or operational practices, but could be achieved in order to 
limit further orbital debris created by any space operation. 
Lastly, research into the possible use of particle free propellants is another 
option available. Elimination of particles from solid rocket motors can be accomplished; 
such a program already exists for tactical missile propellants. If aluminum oxide particles 
are removed from propellants, small debris would be greatly reduced. In closing, Figure 
44 illustrates the effect of debris mitigation measures on the debris environment; clearly, 
mitigation efforts have a positive influence on debris population numbers. 
b. Disposal 
Disposal options for LEO include the elimination of orbital debris objects. 
This avenue of approach is more aggressive than mitigation practices because it removes 
large objects from the environment that can pose a potential hazard in the creation of new 
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debris. The largest drawback to this strategy is that it usually involves significant costs 
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Figure 44. Effect of Debris Mitigation Measures on the Debris Environment. [Ref. 10] 
Disposal practices can be incorporated into a spacecraft system in two general 
approaches: through mission design and through system configuration and operations. 
Mission design includes all those activities which dispose of debris through the careful 
design of the system's mission. However, these measures often have a significant 
performance penalty to both the launching craft and the satellite itself. For launch 
vehicles, this involves allowing sufficient propellant to remain in order to perform a 
controlled de-orbit burn. Or if the stage cannot inherently perform these maneuvers, it 
must be modified in order to accomplish this option. For satellites, disposal involves the 
same considerations; valuable fuel must be available to perform required de-orbiting 
maneuvers. Spacecraft mass penalty for providing de-orbit capabilities are shown in 
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Figure 45. One can see that the mass penalty continues to grow with increasing altitude 
but the slope becomes relatively flat beyond 10,000 km. The goal for the satellite is to 
achieve a re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere and be disposed of in the ocean [Ref. 12, p. 
182]. A trash or disposal orbit is also a feasible solution. However, for LEO, this is not a 
good strategy because it requires a two-burn maneuver that is more fuel prohibitive than a 
single bum required for re-entry. In any event, disposal techniques provide a means of 
reducing potentially hazardous debris sources. However, systemic studies to determine 
what is the most cost-effective course of action, and what considerations dictate the 
optimization criteria for a particular project are required. Figure 46 shows the effect of 
disposal orbit lifetime on the debris environment. 
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Figure 46. Environmental Projections for Post Mission Disposal Option. [Ref. 33] 
When systems are not designed with disposal requirements, there are other 
alternatives available. These include looking at system configurations and operations; 
such as design modifications to current systems or design attributes for new systems. For 
LEO stages or spacecraft, it could be possible to maneuver to a lower perigee and employ 
a device to significantly increase drag. The effect of atmospheric drag on a satellite can 
be increased by deploying a large balloon which increases the effective area of the 
satellite without significantly increasing its mass. For objects orbiting below 800 km, a 
balloon with a diameter of 15 m can reduce the orbital lifetime of a satellite from several 
years to several weeks. Figure 4 7 shows orbital decay rates for spacecraft with and 
without various balloons attached. One of the advantages of drag device concepts is that 
the satellite does not need to maintain any specific orientation; no attitude control system 
is required. Drawbacks, however, to drag devices are that decreases in collision 
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probabilities due to shorter orbital lifetimes are offset by increased cross sectional area of 
the satellite. Similarly, studies and cost effectiveness assessments are required in order 
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Figure 47. Orbit Decay Rates. [Ref. 12, p. 183] 
c. Removal 
Removal is as the name implies: it encompasses all means of active removal 
or "cleaning up" of the space debris environment by means of another system. Presently, 
the need for removal is only feasible, in terms of cost effectiveness, to LEO. 
Removing large, inert objects requires some type of maneuverable system. 
This system must be able to rendezvous with the object to be removed and grapple onto 
it. To date, STS missions have proven capable of performing this activity at low altitudes 
and inclinations; but no unmanned system has these capabilities for higher altitudes and 
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inclinations. Conceptual studies indicate that these types of missions could be conducted 
with further analysis and development of new autonomous or remotely controlled 
removal systems; such as the Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV) under development by 
NASA. An OMV has several methods for removal of an object. First, it can perform a 
de-orbit maneuver, separate from the collected object and re-insert itself into orbit while 
the discarded object re-enters Earth. Next, the OMV and the collected object can remain 
together and maintained in a "safe" orbit for possible use as spare parts or raw materials. 
Another alternative is to rendezvous with an object and then attach a de-orbit device, such 
as a de-orbit propulsion kit or a drag inducing device. Lastly, the use of tethers could be 
employed in order to transfer moment between the OMV and the grappled object, thus 
lowering the orbit of the debris object and raising the orbit of the OMV. There are 
several concerns about using OMV s. First, there are legal and political limitations on the 
retrieval of space objects. Also, objects may be difficult to attach to if they are 
uncooperative, such as spinning or tumbling. Or, mission time required for orbit phasing 
and rendezvous could overtax the power supply of an OMV [Ref. 12, p. 180]. In the end, 
the cost is prohibitive; in LEO, an OMV could probably rendezvous with no more than 
two objects at a time. 
As for the removal of small pieces of debris, currently no method exists. 
However, two strategies have been proposed: one is the use of active or passive devices 
to intercept particles with a medium, such as a large foam balloon, which absorbs the 
particles' kinetic energy. These 'debris sweepers' cause intercepted particles to decay 
more rapidly [Ref. 12, p. 184]. The other method calls for an active device to illuminate 
the particle with a directed energy beam causing the particle to either lose velocity or be 
broken into smaller fragments of less threatening mass and size. There are drawbacks to 
both proposals. The first system has a hard time differentiating between active and 
inactive objects; it could inflict damage on useful payloads. The other calls for elements 
that currently do not exist [Ref. 3, p. 34]. Figure 48 shows the theoretical benefits of 
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Figure 48. Effectiveness of Subsequent Active Removal of Small Objects [Ref. 3, p. 34] 
The least cost effective manner for removmg objects are those that are 
considered after the fact. They require adding new mass and systems into the 
environment, and their operations are difficult. While they are technically feasible, they 
are not viable candidates in terms of economic considerations [Ref. 2, p. 630]. 
d. Private Sector Recommendations 
The space industry has suggested several varied proposals for coping with the 
debris issue. Some pertinent recommendations to this section are illustrated below. 
Astro Innovations Inc. advocates change to international laws that would 
allow and encourage active salvage operations at GEO and GTO altitudes. The sovereign 
rights of space-faring nations could be maintained, while affording commercially 
attractive salvage opportunities to those so able. 
General Research Corporation describes two orbital debris mitigation systems 
conceptually designed to be used in a variety of configurations to solve a number of 
debris related problems. The first system is a maneuverable free-flying spacecraft, and 
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the second is a shielding unit, or units, attached to the space system being protected. 
Grumman Space Systems proposes the use of their Tumbling Satellite Retrieval Kit in 
order to capture large pieces of orbital debris. 
Finally, Kaman Sciences Corporation proposes a laser device that could be 
used to slow and de-orbit a variety of orbital debris. They claim that existing devices, 
experiments and analysis would permit rapid validation of this concept. All of these 
suggestions are in the conceptual phase and have yet to be validated [Ref. 3]. 
3. Summary 
There are two points of concern: first, cost comparison studies at JSC, as well as 
common sense, have shown that current preventive measures are the best approach to 
controlling the growth of orbital debris [Ref. 12, p. 180]. Preventive measures are 
absolutely preferable to limit the population to an uncritical level. Subsequent active 
removal is always much more difficult, and more expensive. In other words, prevention 
is the best cure for the orbital debris problem. Second, in order to have a significant 
impact on minimizing debris generation it will require a concerted international effort. 
B. ACTIVE DEBRIS PROTECTIVE MEASURES 
In addition to the strategies presented above, two more general options are available 
in order to afford a spacecraft increased survivability in the LEO environment. Unlike 
the previous methods, collision avoidance and spacecraft shielding are reactive 
approaches to the debris threat and do not contribute to the mitigation of the debris issue. 
They directly affect the survivability aspect of a spacecraft through active means. 
1. Collision Avoidance 
The concept of collision avoidance, that is the act of avoiding a possible 
collision through pre-planned or evasive maneuvers, is at its earliest stages of 
employment. Collision avoidance can be implemented at either the pre-launch or during 
on-orbit phases of a mission. Although theoretically possible, actual implementation is 
difficult with current assets available in order to conduct collision avoidance. This is 
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because active maneuvers cannot be based on statistical methods. A prediction of an 
upcoming collision requires that an object endangering the spacecraft be detected in 
advance and specific information on its orbit become available. Active collision 
avoidance of all space objects is not presently practiced. There are limited cases, 
however, of some collision avoidance activities. 
Pre-launch collision avoidance measures are feasible with existing tracking 
sensors. These activities include delaying launch times in order to avoid a passing system 
overhead. For instance, GOES 5 was delayed 36 seconds in order to avoid the passing 
Salyut 6 space station [Ref. 34, p. 2]. There is also the concept of employing traffic 
separation. This type of avoidance collision measure, similar to disposal orbits for 
inactive satellites, must be carefully considered during the earliest phases of a system's 
development. It calls for identifying orbits that are frequently used versus those which 
are of marginal importance or unused. Traffic separation would keep only active 
satellites in active orbital altitude belts. Use of such guidelines are the exception rather 
than the rule. 
There are more collision avoidance measures ongoing in the on-orbit phase of a 
system's deployment. While in orbit, avoidance of particles of 1 em diameter is desirable. 
Presently, warning can only be provided by the existing SSN. However, the existing SSN 
can provide COMBO, collision or miss between orbits, only for objects larger than 1 Ocm, 
but with an uncertainty in position to 1km above, below and across track and 2.5 km 
along track. As will be discussed below, it is feasible to shield against objects 
approximately 1 em or slightly larger, but the mass penalty grows rapidly with the size of 
the impactor to be defended against. 
USSP ACECOM currently provides safe times for launch to various customers, 
such as NASA and Global Positioning System (GPS)/Communications Satellites 
(COMSATS); adherence to their advice is strictly voluntary in nature. More extensive 
support is provided to ongoing STS missions. Their support is two faceted: support 
includes pre-launch collision avoidance and on-orbit collision avoidance. Pre-launch 
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. support is similar to that discussed above. On-orbit support consists of constant analysis 
of the Shuttle's on-orbit position and analyzing the next 36 hours of the Shuttle's mission; 
the latter includes analysis of current and any predicted vector interceptions. 
USSP ACECOM remains constantly in contact with NASA's Field Duty Officer (FDO) at 
JSC. Usually, if anything comes within the Shuttle's safety ellipsoid, 2x5x2 km, the 
NASA FDO considers a maneuver [Ref. 35]. To date, there have been several collision 
avoidance maneuvers involving the STS. 
Another closely related collision avoidance maneuver employed by the STS 
concerns the orbiter's attitude while in space. As a result of over 61 hits, more than 34 
Shuttle windows have had to be replaced because of impact damage since the STS 
program began in 1981 [Ref. 5, p. 26]. The chart depicted in Figure 49 shows the number 
of orbiter window replacements expected for various attitudes. The safest attitude places 
the orbiter's tail toward the direction of flight and the cargo bay toward the Earth. Based 
on this modeling, NASA has adopted this collision 'diminishing' maneuver as policy, 
Shuttle Flight Rule 2-77. It states that this orientation will be used at all times unless it 
compromises mission objectives [Ref. 9, p. 85]. 
Generally, however, the major deficiency with all of these activities is the error 
in the tracking accuracy of current sensors. There are several limitations to the existing 
SSN for collision avoidance purposes. These are primarily a lack of sensor accuracy and 
sensitivity. Current tracking capabilities are not sufficient to permit a collision avoidance 
maneuver to be made. In order to overcome these deficiencies, a major redesign of all 
SSN sensors would be required (as mentioned earlier). Theoretically, a viable collision 
avoidance system would have to manage several tasks as depicted in Figure 50. 
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Figure 49. Shuttle Altitude Positioning Effects Rates of Window Replacements. 
[Ref. 9, p. 85] 
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Figure 50. Task to be Executed by an Ideal Collision Avoidance System. [Ref. 30, p. 1] 
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There have been, however, other options discussed in order to overcome these 
current shortcomings. Proponents claim that it is feasible to do collision avoidance of 
lcm threat objects and to do so at a relatively small fraction of the cost of the actual value 
of assets at risk. The first obvious recommendation is to acquire newer, more 
sophisticated sensors and associated data management systems. Almost immediately, this 
idea would be refused because of cost effectiveness considerations. However, one 
proposal claims that this aspect could be overcome. Clearly, it is not cost effective for the 
space station as a single customer. However, cost could be defrayed by providing 
'service' to more than one customer. The issue then becomes whether such a new system 
is of value to all those who have assets at risk. This proposal calls for a series of six 
sensors and data management systems. It includes two existing sensor assets: an X-band 
version of the current NA VSP ACECOM VHF system and the use of an US Army radar, 
the GBR-T. In addition to these two sensors, four other sensors would be required to 
meet a criterion that any object be tracked by a sensor within two revolutions of a 
predicted conjunction [Ref. 2]. 
Also, collision avoidance could be enhanced through the use of on-board 
detection systems. On-board detection systems can sense and respond to debris too small 
to be tracked by current sensors. Unfortunately, there are inherent limitations to this 
proposal. This includes constraints associated with the on-board sensor's field of view. 
That is, the sensor has been shown to be able to detect possible collisions with other 
objects several revolutions ahead of the predicted impact intersection in the same plane; 
given this scenario, D. Rex from Germany's Technical University of Braunschweig, has 
demonstrated that the avoiding maneuver itself could be performed with less than a lrnls 
velocity increment [Ref. 12, p. 65]. However, such a sensor would not be able to do so 
for out-of-plane threats; all threats to a spacecraft are basically out-of-plane. There would 
not be sufficient time for maneuver given the relative velocities involved. Moreover, a 
radar required in order to detect debris in all directions around a spacecraft would require 
too much power; clearly, this is not a viable option [Ref. 2, p. 37]. 
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Despite these shortcomings, the necessity of avoiding maneuvers is a given due 
to the fact that not all the impacts of objects endangering a space structure can be made 
ineffective by shielding. Overcoming these difficult problems will necessitate future 
studies and development. 
2. Shielding 
Through various configurations and use of new age materials, shielding of 
spacecraft is now possible from debris objects of lcm in diameter. Currently, there are 
four major types of shielding available to spacecraft. These are the conventional Whipple 
shield, the Nextel Multi-Shock (MS) shield, the Mesh Double-Bumper (MDB) shield and 
the Russian use of standoff screens. 
The conventional approach to protect from hypervelocity particle impacts is to 
use two walls separated by a space, called the standoff space, in order to reduce shielding 
weight from that required by a single, monolithic wall. As shown in Figure 51, the 
function of the first sheet or 'bumper' is to break up the incoming projectile into a cloud of 
material containing both projectile and bumper debris. This cloud expands while moving 
across the standoff, resulting in the impactor momentum being distributed over a wider 
area on the rear wall. The back sheet must then be thick enough to withstand the blast 
loading from the debris cloud and any solid fragments which remain in the cloud. In the 
design of protective shields, a key factor governing the performance of spaced shields is 
the state of the debris cloud projected from the bumper toward the back plate; the 
contents of the 'ejecta' determines the amount of damage caused to the rear wall. The 
more vaporized the contents of the ejecta are the less damage that occurs to the rear wall. 
Hence, a penetrating particle is broken up and partially vaporized before striking the back 
plate (or spacecraft hull) [Ref. 36, p. 2]. 
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Figure 51. Dynamics of a Hypervelocity Impact. [Ref. 36, p. 2] 
This arrangement, shown in Figure 52, is known as a Whipple shield. The 
design is named after the astronomer Fred Whipple, who first proposed it as protection 
against natural meteoroids in 1947. For most conditions, a Whipple shield results in a 
significant weight reduction over a single plate of solid aluminum. It has been 
demonstrated at JSC that a single aluminum sheet will be over 5 times heavier than an 
aluminum dual wall structure for an encounter with an aluminum projectile at 7km/s. 
However, Whipple shields are less effective at low impact velocities and at certain 
oblique angles. At these conditions, low impact pressures are generated in the projectile 
and bumper that results in solid fragments impacting with the rear wall. These solid parts 
within the debris cloud damage the rear wall significantly; vaporization of these solid 
elements in the cloud occurs only at higher velocity impacts [Ref. 36, p. 4]. 
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Figure 52. Whipple Shield. [Ref. 9, p. 16] 
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A new shielding concept under development by NASA is the MS shield. This 
shield, illustrated in Figure 53, consists of ultra-thin spaced bumper elements that 
repeatedly shock an impacting projectile. Through multiple shocking of the projectile, 
the projectile's thermal state is driven to a higher condition than that achieved by a single 
shock provided by a Whipple shield. In fact, the extent of projectile melting and 
vaporization that would be expected at 10 km/sec for a Whipple shield is achieved by the 
MS shield at 6.3 km/sec. Hence, the MS shield overcomes the low velocity vulnerability 
characteristics of the Whipple shield. Also, a 30 to 40% reduction in shielding weight, 
compared to the conventional aluminum Whipple shield, is possible using the MS shield 
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Figure 53. Multi-Shock Shield. [Ref. 9, p.16] 
The MDB is another advanced shield that provides similar protection and weight 
savings benefits as the MS shield. Figure 54 illustrates a schematic of the shield. It was 
developed to show that major improvements in shielding protection could be achieved 
over conventional Whipple shields by simply adding a mesh a short distance in front of 
the existing Whipple bumper and putting a high strength fabric layer in the standoff area. 
Tests have shown that a double bumper system with a mesh outer bumper exhibits 
superior performance than the same weight double bumper consisting of two continuous 
aluminum sheets. The aluminum mesh does not produce damaging secondary ejecta 











In addition to the shield concepts discussed above, Russian spacecraft designers 
employ the use of a Whipple type shield concept termed standoff screens. Unlike the 
other techniques described above, standoff screens are an informal manner of providing 
some degree of shielding to spacecraft; optimization of shield design and associated 
weight is not present in this type of shielding. In a study conduct by Kaman Sciences 
Corp. for NASA on the Mir Space station shielding, Dr. McKnight concluded that the 
Russians do not have a standard shield design per se. Instead, they rely on an aluminum 
bumper about 2 em from the spacecraft's pressure wall; the screen is about lmm in 
thickness. This sheet has been described as just thick enough to vaporize the impactor 
[Ref. 37, p. 9]. 
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In order to maximize a shield design, a simplified method has been used to 
roughly size the thickness of the bumper(s) and the rear wall of meteoroid/debris shields 
and estimate shielding weights. This method is illustrated in Figure 55. Although 
adequate for deriving estimates of shielding weights and for performing quick trade 
studies, this approach is not suitable for verifying design adequacy or for assessing design 
options to greater level of detail because of the overly simplified assumptions on 
meteoroids/debris impact angle and velocity distributions. 
In summary, shielding techniques are now available that provide adequate 
protection against debris particles of 1 em, or slightly larger, in diameter. Maximizing a 
shield's protective properties involves an interplay between plate thickness, plate spacing 
and material weight. A renewed emphasis on the development of low-weight shielding 
alternatives to the conventional Whipple shield concept have been required as a result of 
the growing threat from orbital debris. 
1. Given space vehicle size, orientation, orbitalll;ltitude (h), inclination (i), and years of exposure 
2. Select desired meteoroid and debris protection capability, such as probability of no-penetration (PNP), 
over a specific time period (t). 
3. Calculate effective exposed surface area (A) for each side of oriented space vehicle or for entire surface of 
randomly oriented space vehicle. Include effects of shadowing from adjacem sttucturcs. Include flux factors 
on each surface of oriented space vehicle. Include Earth shadowing and focusing factors for meteoroids. 
A= f(size, orientation, altitude, M&D directionalily) 
4. Calculate meteoroid and debris pcnettation flux, FM&D· 
FM&D = f(PNP, A, t) 
5. Calculate panicle diameters, dM & do, of meteoroids and debris lhat lhe space vehicle must be protected 
against to meet required protection level. 
dM & do= f(FM&D· h, i, Solar flux) 
6. Select shield type: monolilhic, 2-sheet Whipple shield, Multi-Shock shield, Mesh Double-Bumper 
shield, etc. 
7. Calculate shield parameters: bumper and rear wall thiclcnesses, spacings, and weights. These arc a 
function of shield type and shielding material properties; and meteoroid/debris panicle size, velocity, 
density, shape, and impact angle. 
Figure 55. Shielding Methodolgy. [Ref. 38, p. 2] 
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C. SUMMARY 
In closing for this chapter, we have explored most aspects of current and proposed 
space debris minimization and active debris protective measures. With this in mind, a 
present desideratum would be to pursue those activities and practices that are most likely 
to lead to a stable and desirable environment over the long term while addressing current 
day survivability threats. More so, since the continued use of the LEO environment 
appears likely, and with it the level of activity involving NASA's Civil Needs Data Base. 
The need for orbital design considerations is clear. One manner for effectively achieving 
this goal is the topic of the final chapter. Finally, one last comment. By the now, the 
reader may have come to the realization that there exists a great inconsistency in terms of 
shielding and tracking capabilities. That is, given the limitations of current tracking 
capabilities and of available shielding techniques, a 'gap' in protective measures is 
evident. This gap and its effects are highlighted in Figure 56. As frightening as this 
realization may be, it simply serves to reinforce the fact that orbital debris is a 
tremendous problem whose solution will require unprecedented efforts by all concerned. 
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Figure 56. The Bottom Line. [Ref. 39] 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. WHERE ARE WE? 
Thus far, several interesting issues have come to light. The debris issue has been 
examined and analyzed in terms of its physical and behavioral characteristics, and its 
current status in the international arena has also been explored. The dynamic nature and 
relationship of several of the discussed properties are summarized in Figure 57, where the 
various sources of orbital debris are delineated. The feasibility of several debris-related 
techniques for addressing the situation have been discussed as well. A synopsis of the 
advantages and disadvantages to each major debris abatement technique is presented in 
Figure 58, where "operational debris" refers to operational satellites as cataloged by 
USSPACECOM. It must be noted that the column labeled technical feasibility is 
intended to indicate the level of difficulty of a particular technique as compared to other 
techniques. This is because, as previously noted, no avoidance measure can be 
characterized as "simple," in part due to the fact that current ephemeris are not accurate 
enough to avoid debris on a regular basis. As has been demonstrated, more data, and 
more sensors, are necessary to avoid collisions with space objects. 
The research effort has reached its principal goal of shedding light on the orbital 
debris dilemma by examining and analyzing the current extent of the debris problem, 
uncovering a variety of truths and fallacies along the way. In this final chapter, general 
observations on the subject are made and possible solutions are proposed, based upon the 
information presented thus far. 
The facts of the case point to and support several undeniable observations 
concerning the debris issue. These indicators paint an unsettling portrait. The biggest 
concern associated with the debris issue is that it is not a static problem; to the contrary, it 
is very dynamic and complex by nature. It is a physical and threatening problem that is 
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constantly growing and worsening in effect with time. None of the efforts currently 
under way have demonstrated the ability to temper the rate of this growth, as is evidenced 
by the information presented in Chapter II ofthis paper. The dangers of the orbital debris 
environment threaten the very future of space flight activity. 
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Figure 58. Efficiency, Feasibility and Costs of Debris Mitigation Measures. [Ref. 17] 
Another realization has been that there is no guiding policy of substance on debris. 
Coupled with this is the fact that there doesn't seem to be a sense of urgency involved 
about the problem. While there is general acknowledgement that the problem exists, 
there is hesitation in developing a comprehensive plan for solving the problem on an 
international level. The fact that isolated efforts have been made to decrease the growth 
of the orbital debris population is aggravated by this lack of international consensus, 
because it takes so much time for the effects of mitigation efforts to become apparent. 
The author believes this is primarily due to either decision-makers, policy makers, 
or governments that haven't come to grips with the fact that it is a threatening problem 
and that coping with this problem is going to take a lot of effort in terms of money and 
resources. 
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B. UNDERLYING INDICATORS 
1. Observations 
The first point to be made is that the lack of leadership in dealing with the orbital 
debris issue is at the heart of the problem. Individual agency efforts around the world 
demonstrate that there is interest in the space program community about addressing this 
problem, but the lack of a participant willing to take on leadership responsibility is 
enough to keep those efforts confined to an ineffective role. Beyond solution generating 
shortcomings, however, the very lack of leadership on the issue is itself exacerbating the 
lack of awareness about its severity. With no one willing to champion the cause, it is 
unlikely that "orbital debris" will ever arouse much interest or action in the democratic 
populations that financially maintain space programs. 
Secondly, it must be noted that the current level of organization and action on the 
problem is insufficient to the task. This is so because of the lack of centralized standards, 
monitoring, and control. While NASA is, after all, the national space organization, 
NASA and DoD both contribute to the US share of the space exploration and use market, 
and there is no mechanism nor protocol to jointly address the orbital debris issue. 
Beyond the lack of a single vision on the national scene, however, is DoD's lack of 
coordinated effort. There is no single entity through which to coordinate the activities of 
the various DoD departments who are involved in space programs. 
This lack of coordination and control is magnified at the international level, and the 
growing list of participants in orbital space activity presents yet another dimension to a 
problem that is already projected to grow critical in the near future. The complexity of 
the problem is further compounded by the fact that it is moving beyond the interaction of 
national governments and into the private sector, where Motorola Corporation is engaged 
in employing an exclusive communications satellite network. One could easily imagine 
that each of the companies today engaged in installing and maintaining communications 
lines will one day expect the right to establish orbital communications equipment as a 
matter of course. The orbital debris issue, therefore, will require the kind of uniform 
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standards and efforts that can only come from universal acceptance. If the processes 
involved in reaching and maintaining international agreements are not soon begun, it is 
very doubtful that a solution will be possible prior to the development of a critical 
situation in near-Earth space. Viewed in this light, all of the various program and/or 
agency level activity regarding orbital debris does nothing to mitigate the size of the 
problem to be faced over the horizon. 
This leads to yet another observation: when agencies and/or individual programs 
examine orbital debris issues, it is in the very specific context of what that agency or 
program is trying to accomplish. In other words, the efforts of, for instance, the European 
Space Agency to deal with orbital debris concerns in relation to an upcoming satellite 
deployment program says nothing at all about dealing with the orbital debris problem as a 
whole. This makes the point again: only a total solution will guarantee future freedom 
from concern about the threats posed by orbital debris. As has been noted in previous 
chapters, discussions related to measurement formulae, modeling technique, shielding 
methodologies, and other factors leave unaddressed the kind of comprehensive approach 
that would be evidenced, for instance, by the establishment of specific guidelines to be 
followed by everyone engaged in the design of spacecraft. 
By the same token, however, the tendency to curb "over-study" of the issue must be 
avoided. While action is needed, there remains a great deal of information to be gathered 
in order to maintain adequate safeguards. Between the beginning and end of negotiations 
to agree on universal action, in fact, information will come to light that substantially 
influences the content of such agreements. 
When one looks at the effectivesnesss of existing debris mitigation practices, they 
are found to be wanting. Efforts to mitigate the problem are limited in scope and 
inadequate in terms of results. This is so because, in the case of already designed 
spacecraft, mitigation cannot redesign the vehicle to achieve goals; in the case of 
spacecraft currently being designed, mitigation efforts are rarely employed. In the first 
instance, the best case scenario is to make a minimal reduction in the amount of debris 
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placed into orbit. In the instance of spacecraft in design, other pressures have combined 
to force debris mitigation off of the drawing board. 
Most significant among these pressures are those related to budget issues. Debris 
mitigation-incurred budget line items are perceived as unnecessary expenses. At worst, 
debris mitigation forces a design team to include budget items that are brought about by 
consideration of current and future spacecraft survivability issues, which does nothing to 
endear a budget director or Congressman to a particular program. This is another area in 
which the lack of leadership-generated public awareness of the orbital debris dilemma 
often serves to offer up debris mitigation funding on the altar of budgetary reduction. 
The very wording of the 1988 National Space Policy reinforces the idea that debris 
mitigation is, unwisely, given a back seat to other considerations, by saying, "reduce the 
accumulation of space debris consistent with ... cost effectiveness." In fact, the first ever 
spacecraft to be designed with orbital debris considerations is the yet to be deployed 
Space Station. 
This is not to say that spacecraft designers and builders do not conduct vulnerability 
and risk analysis for their projects. Once it is determined that debris is within an 
acceptable level of risk, with low Probability of No Penetration (PNP), however, they 
move on to the rest of the design process. What is needed is a proactive effort toward 
debris mitigation. 
C. NEW CONCEPTS 
1. Change of View 
In the course of this endeavor, it has become apparent that the debris issue is a 
complex one. Existing efforts address it by breaking it apart into smaller, more 
manageable pieces. This apparently makes complex tasks and subjects more manageable, 
but really serves to disassociate related elements of the same overall problem. In this 
state of fragmentation, the consequences of our actions are unclear. When trying to affect 
the big picture, the pieces must be put back together. But, as physicist David Bohrn says, 
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the task is futile - it is similar to trying to reassemble the fragments of a broken mirror to 
see a true reflection. [Ref. 18, p. 68] 
It is the purpose of this section to put forward the idea that the issue of space 
debris must be viewed under a different light, a shift in perspective. The intent is not to 
develop a solution and present a means for its implementation, which is beyond the scope 
of this work. Rather, it is the intent to illustrate that the current state of the debris issue, 
like so many other complex problems challenging our world, is complicated by the 
inability to see it as a whole. 
a. Systems Thinking 
Systems thinking is a discipline for seeing wholes. It is a framework for 
seeing interrelationships rather than things, for seeing patterns of change rather than static 
snapshots. It is a set of general principles spanning fields as diverse as the physical and 
social sciences, engineering and management. It is also a set of specific tools and 
techniques, originating in two threads: in "feedback" concepts of cybernetics and in 
"servo-mechanism" engineering theory dating back to the 19th century. 
Systems thinking is needed to address the orbital debris issue in order to 
avoid becoming overwhelmed by complexity. The scale of this complexity is without 
precedent. All around us are examples of systemic breakdowns - problems such as global 
warming, ozone depletion, the international drug trade and the US trade and budget 
deficits - problems that have no simple local cause. Systems thinking is a discipline for 
seeing the "structures" that underlie complex situations, and for discerning high from low 
leverage change. That is, by seeing wholes we learn how to foster system "health." 
In our efforts to address circular relationships, it is human nature to try to 
resolve those circles into straight lines. Herein lie the beginnings of our limitations as 
systems thinkers. In order to become successful in systems thinking, the linear viewpoint 
must be abandoned in order to realize that the world around us is organized in a circle or 
loop of cause-effect relationships which are called feedback processes. Note that in 
systems thinking, feedback means any reciprocal flow of influence; nothing is ever 
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influenced in just one direction. And, most importantly, from the systems perspective, 
the human actor is part of the feedback process, not standing apart from it. This 
represents a profound shift in awareness, allowing systems thinkers to realize how they 
constantly influence, and are influenced by, systems. 
Systems thinking applies to the orbital debris issue due to its fundamentally 
dynamic complexity. There are two types of complexity: detail and dynamic. 
Conventional forecasting, planning and analysis methods are equipped to deal with detail 
complexity; they cannot, however, handle dynamic complexity which involves situations 
where cause and effect are subtle, and where the effects over time of interventions are not 
obvious. Such is the case with the orbital debris situation. When the same action has 
dramatically different effects in the short run and the long, there is dynamic complexity. 
When an action has one set of consequences locally and a very different set of 
consequences in another part of the system, there is dynamic complexity. And, when 
obvious interventions produce non-obvious consequences, there is dynamic complexity. 
Systems thinking is ideally accomplished over the long term, and for all these reasons 
space debris ties in closely to the notion of systems thinking. 
Since the debris situation is fundamentally a problem of dynamic complexity, 
systems thinking can offer new insights into the causes and possible cures. Addressing 
the orbital debris issue requires seeing the interrelationships, the delays between action 
and consequence, and the patterns of change, not just the 'snapshots' of the problem. 
Seeing the major interrelationships underlying a problem leads to new insight into what 
might be done to solve it. 
b. Shared Vision 
Another application that the space debris problem may benefit from is the 
development of what social scientists call a shared vision. A shared vision is beyond an 
idea; beyond even an important idea. It is, rather, a driving force of impressive power. It 
may be inspired by an idea, but once it gets started then it is no longer an abstraction. It 
is palpable. People begin to see it as if it exists. Few, if any, forces in human affairs are 
96 
as powerful as shared vision. At its simplest level, a shared vision is the answer to the 
question "what do we want to create?" In learning organizations, shared vision is vital 
because it provides the focus and energy for learning. [Ref. 18, p. 205] 
Shared vision matters because it establishes an overarching goal. A shared 
VISIOn also provides a rudder to keep the learning process on course when stresses 
develop. With a shared vision, one is more likely to expose his ways of thinking, give up 
deeply held views as they are proven invalid, and recognize personal and organizational 
shortcomings. All troubles seem trivial compared with the importance of what one is 
trying to create. Also, shared vision fosters risk taking and experimentation. Lastly, 
shared vision enables a commitment to the long term view. Again, given the current state 
of 'vision' within the space community, the debris issue can stand to gain much from the 
development of an international sense of shared vision. 
Shared vision is essential to developing an approach to the problem of orbital 
debris because, given the lack of an international body of law, it is a means to an end. 
Visions spread because of a reinforcing process of increasing clarity, enthusiasm, 
communication and commitment. As people talk, the vision grows clearer. As it gets 
clearer, enthusiasm for its benefits builds. Where international policy fails, shared vision 
can drive people to doing the right thing in terms of space debris efforts until it can be 
repaired. 
2. New Methodologies 
This section deals with less ethereal suggestions, ideas firmly planted in 
scientific procedures. They encompass thoughts regarding new guidelines for designing 
spacecraft. The underlying concept is that spacecraft must be designed in such a manner 
that the environment, in our case orbital debris, is the design driver. 
a. The Obvious 
After reviewing all the available data concerning the subject, proactive debris 
mitigation efforts appear to be the only method by which to insure that there is no future 
exacerbation of the problem; if no new sources of debris are injected into LEO, and given 
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sufficient time, argues Kessler, the problem will correct itself through natural means 
(orbital decay). In this section, mitigation applications refer to those presented earlier on 
in Chapter IV; they include both design and operational procedure considerations. 
The importance of the group of activities labeled as mitigation practices 
cannot be overemphasized. Utilization of these practices in different application 
scenarios can contribute significantly to the defeat of the debris problem. For the most 
part, two general scenarios exist. The first involves those payloads and launch vehicles 
already near completion or constructed, and second includes those space vehicles and 
satellites in the design phase and/or coming in the future. Different mitigation 
applications can be applied in both these cases to help contribute to the reduction and 
future creation of orbital debris. 
Mitigation applications are more difficult in the case of existing spacecraft 
and vehicles. This is true both in terms of technical application and cost effectiveness. 
Mitigation practices in this case would normally consist of after the fact design alterations 
or device add-ons, or changes to current launch procedures and practices and on-orbit 
operations, e.g., de-orbit before fuel is depleted. Designing after the fact always creates a 
myriad of unknown problems which for the most part are strenuous and time consuming 
to overcome. A secondary fallout from this condition is that additional time and 
resources usually contribute to additional moneys being spent on the project, a prospect 
not too pleasing to any project manager. Moreover, at this point and time in the 
development process, few projects are within their projected fiscal boundaries. 
Introduction of any type of design change at this point would be unappreciated and 
unlikely to be accepted. Hence, in this case, it would be difficult to introduce mitigation 
practices and convince managers of the intangible benefits regarding debris minimization. 
If mitigation cases are properly introduced at the onset of a space project, 
however, the probability of survival of these applications is much higher. At this stage, 
vehicles are designed around the debris environment, technical obstacles are addressed 
early on and cost is minimized. 
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In addition to early application of these activities, a sincere commitment to 
the principles of surrounding mitigation/reduction activities must be developed. Debris 
mitigation must be a part of the operations concept that accompanies the basic statement 
of need or program initiating document. Debris mitigation must be a clearly stated policy 
in the concept definition phase. In essence, decision makers must make a commitment to 
ensure debris mitigation is a priority throughout the various phases of a space vehicle's 
lifecycle. [Ref. 2, p. 571] Without a commitment, or as Dr. Senge would say, a 'shared 
vision', mitigation applications cannot overcome the real enemy: money. Failure to 
achieve either one of these requirements, early application and a commitment to the ideal, 
will diminish the possibility of any type of mitigation measures being accepted into a 
space project. 
The mitigation practices must be looked at in systemic terms; that is, a closed 
loop where each stage influences the next. Refer to Figure 59. Borrowing from the 
concepts of Dr. Senge, the use of mitigation applications must be viewed in terms of a 
closed system or cycle. Viewing the debris situation and the application of mitigation 
practices under this light may offer new perspectives and insights into the debris problem. 
Instead of looking at pieces of the puzzles, seeing the whole picture can help one to 
overcome the mental structures which prohibit one from seeing how the parts affect the 
whole. Although detailed discussion of this approach is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
the introduction and application of this idea is not. 
Thus, despite budgetary forces, mitigation applications must prevail. 
Unfortunately, there is no given formula to apply in order to assure the survival of 
mitigation practices within a space-related project. It really comes down to ethereal 




Figure 59. Debris Mitigation Cycle for Spacecraft. 
b. Available Tools 
In the course of this effort, several valid tools for the applications of debris 
related methods were discovered. Similar to most debris actions. it \vas found that these 
analytical tools were not being used as much as they should be in light of the threat that 
debris poses. This section highlights three major tools encountered and discusses their 
applicability to the debris situation. These are the Bumper II program from JSC, the 
EnviroNET on-line/interactive service from Marshall Space Flight Center, and the use of 
vulnerability and risk assessment analysis methods. These "tools" can be used to bring 
about some of the applications discussed thus far concerning t_he incorporation of 
mitigation measures. Again, the scope of this thesis limits itself to discussion of and 
application of these important tools to the design of space vehicles. 
( 1) Bumper. Bumper is a computer program used a: JSC to evaluate 
Micrometeoroid and Debris (M&D) damage and shield penetration risks. It links the 
M&D er:vironm.e::.ts with results of Hype:-veloc!ty Impact (HVI) tests and analysis anc 
element geometry to calculate impact risks. [Ref. 40. p. 6] Originally developed by 
Boeing. Bumper has been modified by l':ASA to incorporate updated shield response 
equations: additionally. Bumper predictions have beer:. correlated with the kno\vn history 
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ofM&D impacts observed on LDEF. Among its many uses, Bumper is used in analyses 
of spacecraft shielding systems in order to identify M&D risk drivers. The object of these 
analyses is to optimize shielding weights, thereby saving weight and /or improving M&D 
survivability, by distributing the weights on a particular element to more equally balance 
M&D penetration risks with shielding weight. In addition to assessing the validity of 
shielding proposals, the use of Bumper also allows the user to see what effect the 
'shadowing' and the effect of orientation has on the M&D penetration risks. Shadowing 
refers to the use of non-critical components to cover or shadow more critical components, 
thereby acting as a shield against incoming debris. Orientation deals with the flight 
attitude of a vehicle; as was alluded to with the STS, lower probability of penetrations 
occur at specific attitudes and minimizes M&D risks. In all, Bumper is a M&D damage 
assessment technique which can be used effectively, as with the Space Station, for impact 
probability analyses of any space vehicle. 
(2) EnviroNET. EnviroNET serves a similar purpose in that it helps to define 
the debris environment and, thus, design for it accordingly. This is a NASA service 
facility that can provide spacecraft designers with on-line or dial-up technical information 
on space environmental conditions. Included in the system is an interactive graphics 
facility to model debris collisions likely to be encountered by spacecraft in a variety of 
orbital regimes. The main EnviroNET topical areas to space debris are found in section 
8.8.2 of the handbook. [Ref. 41, p. 18] 
In all there are five interactive models dealing specifically with the orbital 
debris topic. These include an orbital debris model, a meteoroid model, an orbital decay 
model, a solar flux data model and a probability of impact model. Through the use and 
incorporation of the results of these models, spacecraft or payload design can be assessed 
against the most severe combination of natural and artificial environments. 
(3) Vulnerability and Risk Analyses. Lastly, there is the use of certain design 
analyses procedures to help identify spacecraft vulnerabilities and potential hazards, 
specifically, the use of vulnerability and risk analyses. It is not known with certainty 
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whether these procedures are used in the design of a spacecraft or to what extent they are 
incorporated into the overall design process. Specifically, spacecraft design must include 
a process by which threats to a spacecraft are identified. Once identified, appropriate 
measures should then be incorporated into the design of the vehicle in order to defeat or 
overcome these hazards. This is the goal of a vulnerability type analysis. A summary of 
tasks for designing a less vulnerable spacecraft may include those tasks identified in 
Figure 60. Through the use of similar processes, vulnerability reduction to spacecraft 
from debris can be institutionalized into the overall design scheme. The designer can also 
improve spacecraft vulnerability by being aware of and by using other methods to reduce 
a spacecraft's susceptibility to various threats. To skillfully approach the improvement of 
a space vehicle's ability to survive in its hazardous operational environment, a responsible 
designer must artfully blend together and utilize concepts from both the vulnerability and 
susceptibility reduction principles. 
As for risk analysis techniques, the general concept remains the same. That 
is, to identify, characterize, quantify and evaluate potential hazards to a spacecraft. To a 
certain extent, both analysis types overlap one another and provide the same information 
for design considerations. In principle, both describe the threat and address methods for 
coping with the same. In terms of debris, the use of any one of these procedures in the 
design methodology of a spacecraft would benefit the cause for either debris mitigation or 
protective measures because the true extent of the debris threat would be brought to light. 
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1. Propose a design . 
• 2. Identify the critical components: 
a. Select a kill category . 
.... 
..... 
b. Assemble a description . 
c. Determine the critical 
components and their 
damage-caused failure modes. 
+ 
3. Perform the vulnerability assessment: 
a. Select the expected threats. 
b. Identify the type and amount of 
damage required to kill each 
component. 
c. Compute the vulnerability measures 
for the components and the 
spacecraft. 
+ 
4. Apply the appropriate vulnerability 
reduction concepts to those components 
or systems that have an unacceptable 
level of vulnerability. 
I 
Figure 60. Summary of Tasks the Vulnerability Analysis. [Ref. 42, p. 114] 
(4) Summary. The importance of these tools is self-evident. Through the use 
of these tools, or many such like items, risk assessment of the debris environment can be 
properly executed. Firstly, identify the hazards and risks that are inherent to the system. 
Next, calculate their causes and probabilities for various designs. Lastly, decide which 
risks can be accepted. In this manner, separation of risks arising from the operation of 
equipment from those resulting directly from the effects of the space environment can be 
accomplished. 
c. Design Flow 
In an informal survey of five different space projects, from both DoD and 
civilian organizations, it was discovered that debris mitigation practices were seldom 
used in the design of a space vehicle or satellite. As previously mentioned, orbital debris 
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considerations into the design of a space vehicle usually consist of a quick check into the 
probability of collision with the same. Usually, based on their calculations, the 
probability of collision is very remote and, consequently, dismissed as insignificant or as 
not being a factor. In the survey, this attitude seemed to be the norm. Moreover, when 
specifically asked, organization representatives stated that debris mitigation steps were 
not formally incorporated into the design process of their vehicles. 
The only exceptions to this rule were the three spacecraft mentioned earlier in 
this paper: the Space Station, IRIDIUM and RADARSA T. Their design methodologies 
heavily incorporated the application of debris mitigation practices, as well as active 
debris protection application. IRIDIUM is the first of its kind to implement a cost and 
technically effective debris mitigation plan. In a telephone interview, Mr. Robert Penney, 
of Motorola SATCOM, verified that cost effectiveness studies for IRIDIUM showed no 
marked increase in cost for the incorporation of debris mitigation practices in the design 
and operational phases of their spacecraft. Their key to success, as stated by Mr. Penny, 
was a commitment to debris mitigation in the very first phases of programs. Though Mr. 
Penny did not provide a specific reason for prior incorporations of mitigation programs, 
he said it probably had more to do with the survivability issue than with the pursuit of a 
mitigation of orbital debris policy. Similarly, the RADARSAT team assessed the hazard 
of the space debris environment and incorporated protective measures into the design of 
their spacecraft. Through the analysis of the space debris threat and various associated 
test programs, primarily in the HVI facility at JSC, their findings led to a number of 
design modifications. Unfortunately, in their case, the spacecraft design was already well 
advanced when it was determined that debris protective measures were necessary. In the 
future, most, if not all, spacecraft will have to be designed in a similar manner in order to 
overcome the debris environment of their day. 
In order to quantify the threat of orbital debris, spacecraft designers must 
undertake an analysis of the orbital debris environment specific to a spacecraft's orbit, and 
an analysis of the spacecraft's vulnerability to that environment. In this context, debris 
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mitigation and protective measures are applicable. Again, it is not the intent of the author 
to elaborately describe a design methodology, but rather to discuss general principles 
associated with spacecraft design methodologies. 
The proposal is simple. First, all future spacecraft designs should include a 
deep commitment to the principles and incorporation of debris mitigation applications. 
Design procedures include all those methods for reducing the production of new debris 
sources at all phases of a satellite's lifecycle; operational procedures include those actions 
that allow a satellite to become less susceptible to the dangers of the debris environment 
through the manipulation of orbital parameters and deployment procedures. Secondly, 
that active debris protective measures, such as shielding or collision avoidance systems, 
be incorporated into the design of a space craft only after conducting detailed 
vulnerability and risk assessment analyses. The key to this proposal is, of course, early 
initiation of these concepts in the design cycle of a space vehicle. As we have seen, to 
implement a cost and technically effective debris mitigation plan, space operators must 
commit to debris mitigation in the very first phases of a space program. It must be a 
clearly stated policy that maintains prominence in the systems engineering and trade-off 
analysis phase. Most importantly, it must be a matter of resolve in the operational phase. 
The entire gamut of mitigation applications cannot be applied to every spacecraft; 
however, if at least one major application is considered, then the future may not be as 
bleak as we may think. 
D. IMPLEMENTATION 
Specific plan steps to deal with the orbital debris problem are beyond the scope of 
the current work. In general terms, however, an intent and direction for action can be 
described. 
Space organizations are inherently bureaucratic, and this presents the most 
fundamental problem to implementing debris mitigation efforts on a comprehensive scale. 
Innovation must be present in any organization that intends to capitalize on new strategies 
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intended to bring about a shared vision. Organizations will resist these kinds of changes 
at every level, and this is because of what has been termed the "bureacratic mindset", 
which seeks comfort in the established and is unsettled at the thought of change. 
Fundamental change is necessary, however. The only way for the various US and 
other national and international space programs to establish processes for addressing and 
effectively dealing with orbital debris issues is for those organizations to address those 
issues at every stage of involvement. This necessitates the development of a learning 
organization, with parallel learning structures that allow for feed-back on critical issues. 
In a learning environment, incorporation of the various tools available for 
mitigation efforts, such as EnviroNet and Bumper, described above, will mean 
incorporation ofthe people and concerns present in those existing activities. In this way, 
individuals involved in collecting and processing information on orbital debris will take 
an active role in the relationship with space program designers and administrators, rather 
than simply passing information on with little understanding of its intended use or 
post-use evaluation of its effectiveness. 
Restructuring space programs to include the widest range of participants will 
establish an environment in which systems thinking can be fostered and a shared vision 
developed. When existing tools are employed, and new tools developed, within the 
context of a larger learning organization, the resulting processes lead to design flow, 
wherein the individual efforts and separate concerns of component projects provide 
feed-back for one another throughout the design and implementation process. 
The difficulties present in implementing a new way of thinking in US programs 
pale in comparison to those associated with moving the effort to the international arena. 
However, no amount of improvement in US programs will result in real change without 
cooperation at the international level. In many ways, the learning organization that must 
be developed to effectively pursue space objectives for the US must grow beyond the 
country's borders to include organizations in other nations and regions. 
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Beyond the establishment of international agreements and standards, however, lies 
the enforcement problem. In a time when compliance with established agreements is 
often called into question among the closest international partners, the prospects for 
compliance with orbital debris mitigation agreements may appear bleak. Like the rest of 
the obstacles to real debris mitigation, however, this issues must be proactively 
addressed, and the establishment of systems thinking and shared vision will go a long 
way toward paving the ground for willing compliance. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The points made in this work have by no means been intended as an exhaustive 
evaluation of the space debris issue. An effort has been made, however, to maintain an 
unbiased perspective from which to draw basic conclusions regarding a logical course of 
action. 
The first of these conclusions, then, is that obital debris can indeed pose a 
significant threat to operations in space. None of the estimates of current and future 
debris mass presented in Chapter II fail to point toward the threat of a "critical mass", at 
which point space-based operations are rendered impossible. Further evidence of the 
significance of this problem has been apparent in the simultaneous drift of space agencies 
around the world toward debris mitigation strategies. Increasing numbers of scientists are 
voicing concern over threats from orbital debris. This movement to recognize the issue 
and the increasing demand for information and projections from those involved in 
mission planning are remarkable for the simple fact that orbital debris has yet to receive 
the attention of a possible major threat. There is a notable lack of leadership, specifically 
at the international level, in the orbital debris control arena. Control strategies, including 
mitigation, retrieval, and de-orbiting, are implemented on a program-by-program, 
agency-by-agency basis. The problem is accelerated by the entrance of additional nations 
in the "space club." 
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On the other hand, organizations representing US, European, and Japanese space 
agencies have undertaken programs on their own and even met together to explore the 
creation of an international set of standards for space exploration that will avoid the 
"carpet of debris" foreseen by the more pessimisstic of industry analysts. The point, 
simply put, is that awareness is spreading about the need to act on orbital debris in order 
to assure future access to orbital space. What remains to be found is the leadership to 
forge a concerted effort toward standards and results. Dedication to the goal is required 
of a responsible player in the game of space; as one person noted, "outer space is by 
nature and treaty a global commons, available for use by all nations. With this potential 
comes responsibility for keeping space safe." [Ref. 2, p. 571] Recognition of this 
responsibility has occurred, but the commitment to keep space safe does not exist. It is 
paramount to develop and foster a responsible attitude throughout this entire process; as 
we've seen, its a closed systemic process. With a proper approach to the entire process, 
the problem could be eliminated. 
Beyond complimentary international goals, however, the US faces a more pressing 
problem. The planned Space Station will necessarily maintain an orbit that will force 
NASA to develop new and innovative solutions to orbital debris collision problems. 
Skeptics note that the Space Shuttle seems to avoid the problem well enough, and this is 
true, but the probability of an encounter increases with the term of exposure in the orbit 
and size of the satellite. If the US intends to take a lasting place in orbital space, 
approaches to orbital debris issues remain a basic requirement. 
The primary need remains information. The ability to track existing debris must be 
employed in combination with a plan to control future debris to arrive at a solution. 
Siding with caution, given an uncertain threat, is an instinctive and precautionary move 
that cannot be easily dismissed or unsubstantiated. More so than anything, it seems to be 
common sense. If we are faced with a threat and we are not sure of the extent or degree 
of that threat, common sense dictates that we arm ourselves or prepare ourselves as best 
we can and certainly not make conditions worse than what they are. 
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Most importantly, there is the need to act now, before it's too late. We must 
intervene now while we can still can affect the outcome of the future environment; we 
cannot allow it to run away from us to the point where we can no longer affect or 
influence it. 
In closing, the reader is left with a small note on things which may yet come to be. 
In the not-too-distant future, Earth could be exhausted of all its resources and remain an 
empty husk. Mankind's only chance for survival lies in the stars. Unfortunately, man is 
trapped on Earth because the surrounding debris belt prohibits passage to the stars. 
109 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
1. McKnight, D., Artificial Space Debris, 1988. 
2. ESA Conference Book, First European Conference on Space Debris, ESA SD-01, July 
1993. 
3. Interagency Group (Space), Report on Orbital Debris, IG(Space) manual (for NSC), 
February 1989. 
4. Kessler, D., Management of the Orbital Environment, Article from Acta Astronautica, 
1992. 
5. US General Accounting Office, Space Program: Space debris a Potential Threat to 
Space Station and Shuttle, GAO/IMTEC-90-18, April 1990. 
6. McKnight,D., Artificial Space Debris: Updates and Insights, A short course, August 
1990. 
7. Alfriend, K.T. & Lewis, D.L., Estimation of the LEO Debris Population and 
Distribution, Paper. 
8. Flury, W., Activities on Space Debris in Europe, Article from Acta Astronautica, 15 
April 1992. 
9. Portree, D., Orbital Debris and Near Earth Environmental Management: A 
Chronology, NASA publication 1320, December 1993. 
10. NASA Debris Minimization Policy, Brief from Space Debris Workshop, 18-20 
November 1993. 
11. Kessler, D., Orbital Debris Environment in Low Earth Orbit: An Update, Article 
from Adv. Space Res., 1993. 
12. Potter, A., Orbital Debris: Technical Issues and Future Directions, NASA 
Conference Publication 10077, September 1992. 
110 
13. Christiansen, E., Spacecraft Meteoroid/Debris Protection, Brief to National Space 
Council, 18-20 November 1993. 
14. Committee on Space Debris, NRC draft copy obtained from Dr. Knowles 
NA VSPACECOM. 
15. Kessler, D., Collisional Cascading: The Limits of Population Growth in LEO, Article 
from Adv. Space Res., 1991. 
16. Ad Hoc Expert Group of the International Academy of Astronautics Committee on 
safety, Rescue, and Quality, Position Paper on Orbital Debris, 27 August 1992. 
17. Eichler, P., The Necessity and Efficiency of Mitigation Measures to Limit the Debris 
Population in LEO, Brief from Space Debris Workshop, 18-20 November 1993. 
18. Senge, P.M., The Fifth Discipline, Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 
August 1990. 
19. Mission Operations Directorate Flight Design and Dynamics Division & Engineering 
Directorate Navigation, Control, and Aeronautics Division, A Parametric Analysis 
of Orbital Debris Collision Probability and Maneuver Rate for Space Vehicles, 
JSC-25898, August 1992. 
20. McKnight, D., Examination of Possible Collisions in Space, Article from Acta 
Astronautica, 1992. 
21. Edgecombe, D., Orbital Debris Policy Issues, Paper, 28 July 1982. 
22. Loftus, J. & Reynolds, R., A Handbook to Support the NASA Policy to Limit OD 
Generation, IAA.3.3-93-700, 16-22 October 1993. 
23. USSPACECOM Regulation 57-2, Minimization and Mitigation of Space Debris, 6 
June 1991. 
24. Anonymous, DoD Space Debris Research Program, Briefing, 24 October 1991. 
25. Baker, H., Policy Considerations for the Regulation of Space Debris, Paper from 1st 
European Conference on Space Debris, April 1993. 
26. McKnight, Flury, Chobotov, Hergott, Johnson, Loftus, Meredith, Perek, Rex, Sax, 
Sukhanov, Wolfe & Yasaka, Orbital Debris: An International Policy Issue, Paper 
B.8-M.3.12, 28 August- 5 September 1992. 
Ill 
27. Toda, S. & Yasaka, T., Space Debris Studies in Japan, COSPAR B.8-M.3.01, 28 
August - 5 September 1992. 
28. Reynolds, R., Types of Models, Brief at Lockheed (Houston), March 1994. 
29. Devere, G., Space Surveillance Network Sensor Contribution Analysis, Brief, 31 
March 1993. 
30. Loftus, J. & Stansbery, E., Protection of Space Assets by Collision Avoidance, IAA 
6.4-93-752, 16-22 October 1993. 
31. Transportation Systems Center, Hazard Analysis of Commercial Space 
Transportation (Vol II: Hazards), Manual for Office of Commercial Space 
Transportation, May 1988. 
32. Waren, H. & Yelle, M., Effects of Space Debris on Commercial Spacecraft: The 
RADARSAT Example, Paper, 24-26 June 1992. 
33. Levin, G., Possible Effects of the "Big LEO" Mobile Satellite Service Constellations 
on the OD Environment, Brief, 18 February 1994. 
34. Perek, L., Safety of Space Activities, AIAA paper, 1983. 
35. Anonymous, Collision Avoidance System, Brief. 
36. Christiansen, E., Advanced Meteoroid and Debris Shielding Concepts, AIAA 
90-1336, 16-19 April1990. 
37. McKnight, D., MIR Space Station Particulate Shielding Study, Study for NASA JSC, 
16 December 1993. 
38. Christiansen, E., Performance Equations for Advanced Orbital Debris Shields, AIAA 
92-1462,24-27 March 1992. 
39. Alfriend, K., Orbital Debris, Brief at NPS, 1993. 
40.Christiansen, E. & Hyde, J. & Snell, G., Spacecraft Survivability in the Meteoroid and 
Debris Environment, AIAA 92-1409,24-27 March 1992. 
41. Anonymous, EnviroNET: The Space Environment Information Service, User guide 
handbook, 5th edition, December 1993. 
112 
42. Walls, J.S., Vulnerability Reduction: Guidelines for the Design of Spacecraft, NPS 
Thesis, September 1987. 
113 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 2 
Cameron Station 
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145 
2. Library, Code 52 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5002 
..., Commander, Naval Space Command 1 .:). 
ATTN: N112 
5280 4th Street 
Dahlgren, VA 22448-5300 
4. Chairman, Code SP 1 
Space Systems Academic Group 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5002 
5. Prof. Dan C. Boger, Code SM/Bo 1 
Space Systems Operations Academic Associate 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
6. Prof. Kyle T. Alfriend, Code SP/Al 
Navy TENCAP Space Chair 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
7. CPT Armando R. Sanchez Castellanos 3 
1781 Alan Shepard 
El Paso, TX 79936 
114 
